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ĀDIŚEṢA

THE ESSENCE OF SUPREME TRUTH

(PARAMĀRTHASĀRA)

SANSKRIT TEXT

WITH TRANSLATION AND NOTES BY

HENRY DANIELSON

E. J. BRILL—LEIDEN—1980

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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

in the order of the Sanskrit *Nāgarī* script

AGM	Acyuta-Grantha-Mālā (Varanasi)
ĪśaU	Īśa-Upaniṣad
US	Upadeśa-Sāhasrī, ed. H. R. Bhagavat, *Minor Works of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya*, Poona Oriental Series, No. 8 (1925; reprint: 1952); tr. P. Hacker (German), Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1949 (prose part)
ṚS	Ṛgveda-Saṁhitā
AiU	Aitareya-Upaniṣad
KaṭhU	Kaṭha-Upaniṣad
GK	Gauḍapādīya-Kārikās; cf. Vetter, 1978
ChU	Chāndogya-Upaniṣad
TĀ	Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka
TU	Taittirīya-Upaniṣad
PTS	Pāli Text Society (London)
PS	Paramārthasāra
BU	Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad
BCA	Bodhicaryāvatāra, by Śāntideva; ed. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Bibl. Indica, 280/1580, Calcutta, 1960; tr. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas*, Paris: Bloud, 1907
BS	Brahma-Sūtras, by Bādarāyaṇa; numerous editions; best tr.: Thibaut, 1904, with following
BSBh	Bhāṣya (commentary) on preceding, by Śaṁkara
BhG	Bhagavad-Gītā
MāU	Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad; cf. Vetter, 1978
MuU	Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad
MDhŚ	Mānava-Dharma-Śāstra ("Laws of Manu")
MNU	Mahā-Nārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad; ed. & tr. J. Varenne, Paris, 1960
MBh	Mahā-Bhārata; best ed.: crit. ed. by V. S. Sukthankar, S. K. Belvalkar, P. L. Vaidya, Poona, 1933-66, 19 vols. in 22 parts
MMK	Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikās, by Nāgārjuna; ed. La Vallée Poussin, with Prasannapadā, comm. by Candrakīrti, Bibl. Buddhica, IV, 1903-13; reprint: Osnabrück, 1970
MSA	Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Alaṁkāra, by Maitreyanātha, ed. & tr. S. Lévi, Bibl. de l'École des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Hist. et Philol., 159, 190, Paris, 1907-11; cf. Frauwallner, 1969, 296 ff.
YD	Yukti-Dīpikā, anonymous comm. on Sāṁkhya-Kārikās; ed. Pulinbehari Chakravarti, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, XXIII, 1928
R.	Rāghavānanda, commentator on PS by Ādiśeṣa; see Introduction, below

RGV	Ratna-Gotra-Vibhāga; see Takasaki, 1966, and Ruegg, 1969
ŚB	Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa; ed. A. Weber, Berlin, 1852-59 (repr.: Delhi, 1964); tr. J. Eggeling, S.B.E., 5 vols.
ŚvU	Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad
SŚ	Saṁkṣepa-Śārīraka, by Sarvajñātman; see Vetter, 1972

INTRODUCTION

Authorship

The present book, entitled *Paramārthasāra* ("Essence of Supreme Truth") according to its verses 9 and 87, consists of 85 *Āryā* verses, which are preceded by two *Triṣṭubh* verses. It was written by a certain Ādiséṣa (called Śeṣa by verse 87), who probably lived in the early sixth century A.D. That the book was written by a single person is made likely by the use of the somewhat rare *Āryā* metre. This metre is based on groups (*gaṇa*) as well as morae (*mātrā*), which prove that it was meant to be sung. Each verse consists of two hemistyches, each hemistych, of two "feet" (*pāda*). The first *pāda* consists of three groups of four morae; the second, of four and a half groups of four morae, with the sixth group of the first hemistych consisting of either four short syllables, or two short syllables enclosing a single long one (length always being determined by either quality or position). The third *pāda* consists of the same configuration as the first; and the fourth, of three and a half groups of four morae plus a single short syllable which forms the sixth "group" of the second hemistych. The metre indirectly gives us a *terminus a quo* for this book: in verse 31, which contains a traditional reference to MāU 1.3, Ādiśeṣa uses the word *viśva* where the Upaniṣad uses *vaiśvānara*. The metre would have made the use of *vaiśvānara* possible, but the author chose *viśva* instead, thereby forcing himself to add a word of three morae; this is the awkward and unnecessary *eva*. Why did he do so? The answer is that Gauḍapāda, in his *Kārikās* on the MāU (GK 1.1 ff.), used the word *viśva* rather than *vaiśvānara*. The obvious conclusion is that Ādiśeṣa copied from Gauḍapāda.

As for the *terminus ad quem*, we have the evidence from YD (p. 25, l. 8, in the edition used by Frauwallner), which quotes

PS 83 *ad* the commentary on *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā* 2. According to Frauwallner (1953, p. 287), the YD existed in the year 550 A.D. Ādiśeṣa must therefore have written his PS some time before the latter date. (Cf. Rüping, 1977, p. 2.)

A commentary on this work has been written by a certain Rāghavānanda, whose date Potter (1970) does not give, but who may not have lived before the sixteenth century. The main interest lies in the many quotations from Upaniṣads and the BhG, which he uses to clarify points of philosophical interest encountered in reading PS. (The abbreviations I use to indicate those works refer to the list of abbreviations on p. IX of this book.)

Ādiśeṣa's PS has twice been edited so far, together with R.'s *Vivaraṇa*, the first time as Volume 12 of the "Trivandrum Sanskrit Series" in 1911, by T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī, the second time as Volume 9 in the "Acyuta-Grantha-Mālā" (Vārāṇasī) in 1932, by Sūrya-Nārāyaṇa Śukla. It is the latter which has served as base for the present text and translation. It presents a very fair text, with only a few minor mistakes; but I have generally (though not always) substituted *anusvāra* nasals in front of stops for the latter's corresponding nasals, in accordance with correct phonetic practice.

Contents

The first three verses set the scene for the whole work, which deals with three main themes:

(1) The "Self" or "Soul" (*ātman*) differs from the world, from the latter's primordial cause, viz., Matter (*prakṛti*), etc.;

(2) the world is an illusion, a product of magic (*māyā*), resembles a mirage (*mṛgatṛṣṇikā*);

(3) the "Self" (*ātman*) = the World Principle (*brahman*) = God (Viṣṇu).

In verse 3, a student enters on the scene, and addresses a *guru*, who turns out to be the author of the PS. He asks him who is the being which forms the subject of transmigration (*saṁsāra*), and why that being transmigrates, and finally, how that being may be delivered from transmigration. Since verse 3 already introduces a speaker, the actual introduction to the book may be regarded as limited to verses 1-2. And, indeed, they are in a metre which differs from that of the remainder of the book, viz., *Triṣṭubh* as against *Āryā*. (See above.)

Verse 1 enumerates the qualities of God: transcendence, singularity, and immanence. This raises some philosophical problems which are of the utmost relevance, and which are met with in similar fashion in Western and Islamic philosophy. The PS treats them briefly, though not without consistency. The pivotal issue is that, if God is only transcendent, man is nothing (as in the *šarī'at* of Islam); but if He is immanent, man's phenomenal existence becomes deified and, consequently, illusory. The latter solution has, with greater or lesser consistency, been adopted by both Hindus and Buddhists, so that they may also accept idolatry (as manifestation of God = *esse in entibus*), which must be anathema to Muslims. Verse 2 of our text presents the logical corollary: if God is immanent in the world, the whole world is also immersed in Him = the Self; so that it is utterly amazing that one should not realize this fact; so that this lack of insight must be due to ignorance (*avidyā*), i.e., illusion (*māyā*).

God = the Self transcends the world of plurality (*dvaita*) = the psycho-physical complex, although He is immanent within it through his = the soul's own error (*bhrānti*) = illusion or magic

(*māyā*) = "play" (*krīḍā*). (See verses 30 ff.) God's transcendence is particularly important in respect of Matter (*prakṛti*), which is primarily a concept taken from the ancient Sāṁkhya doctrine. For Matter is, according to the latter, the *primum mobile*, under impulse from its "qualities" (*guṇa*), viz., "Goodness" (*sattva*), "Passion" (*rajas*), and "Darkness" (*tamas*), each of which acts on creation in its specific way. So, if the text of PS puts God = the Supreme Soul (*paramātman*) over and above Matter, this means that it interprets a basic doctrine of the Sāṁkhya school in a sense consistent with Advaita ("non-plural") Vedānta. I have quoted R.'s commentary *ad locum* in note 2, but it is difficult to decide whether his interpretation is correct. Although PS must have only one author for reasons already stated, there are in it traces of both Sāṁkhya and Vedānta, the latter in a shape we might determine as *Viśiṣṭādvaita,* which postulates that the world is both different and non-different from God = *Brahman* = *Ātman*, i.e., has relative reality. (Cf. note 160 below.)

The student, by the wording of his request in verse 7, demonstrates his adherence to dualism, which is typical of Sāṁkhya. The other verses in which he speaks to his *guru* cannot be attributed to any doctrine in particular; his motive in coming to the *guru* may have provided Śaṁkarācārya with a model for the student seeking truth and deliverance in the prose text (*Gadyaprabandha*) of the US. Verse 70 returns to the theme by stating, in effect, that the student's question has been answered. It is not without inner logic that the verses from 71 onward no longer deal with philosophical problems proper, but expostulate on the status of him who knows Supreme Truth or Reality (*paramārtha*), and has thereby gained deliverance from transmigration. For the text has up to that point stressed the fact that bondage to transmigration does not affect the soul (which is eternally free), but only the psycho-physical complex; conse-

quently, because the soul is the only *ens reale*, bondage is virtual, and due to imputing a "soul nature" to that which is unspiritual. As a further corollary, deliverance has no specific "place," no "heaven," for it is merely due to the attainment of insight. (See verse 73.) Compare with this notion the conception of deliverance according to the Buddhist Vijñānavādin Maitreyanātha (MSA 6.2, quoted in Frauwallner's masterly anthology: 1969, p. 313): "The belief in an Ego does not itself have the character of the Ego, nor does the world of suffering, because it is of a different nature. There is, however, nothing beside these two. Therefore, that belief is an error. Consequently, deliverance is the mere disappearance of that error." That was also the subject of the student's question in PS 5, and its treatment throughout the book shows that its author did not conceive of metaphysics outside the scope of soteriology.

If bondage to transmigration, and consequently to phenomenal existence, is unreal, the world itself cannot be real in a metaphysical sense. For "to be" is the highest, most abstract metaphysical notion, and therefore admits of no differentiation. Hence, if the soul both *is* and *is different* from matter (and consequently also from matter's creation, i.e., the world), the latter cannot *be*. Therefore, although it should be possible for a Yogin, attached to the dualistic metaphysics of Sāṁkhya, to reach deliverance from transmigration by realizing, in practice, that the soul is different from matter, a logically consistent ontology will nevertheless have to face the following alternative: either Soul and Matter both *are*, hence are inseparable; or the Soul alone *is*, Matter *is not* ("does not be"), hence they are separate *ab initio*. Most Western metaphysics since Aristotle has adopted the former possibility, thus gaining essentiality within existentiality for individual man, but losing final deliverance, and consequently subverting "essentiality within existentiality" (Kant) into

"existentiality within essentiality" (Hegel and Marx). (See Przywara, 1962.) Most Indian philosophical schools, on the other hand, have come to adopt the latter possibility (most notably Buddhism and Advaita-Vedānta), thus gaining final deliverance, but losing (or, rather, not making thematic) the individual's essentiality (which turns into mere existentiality, most radically in Buddhism, which may well appeal to modern man in the Western world for exactly this reason).

The foregoing implies that Advaita-Vedānta, whether it is called "monistic" or not (which is a dubious qualification for any Indian school of thought), is a development from Sāṁkhya in a crucial aspect, viz., ontology. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the terminology of Sāṁkhya *Satkāryavāda* (according to which every phenomenon *qua* effect, *kārya, is* insofar as it is identical with matter *qua* cause, *kāraṇa*) recurring in early Advaita-Vedānta. Here, it is used to prove that every phenomenon is unreal *qua ens individuale*, but real *qua ens commune*, i.e., *Brahman* = *Ātman* = God (= *esse et causa*). PS gives many examples of this doctrine, which lead at first sight to an impression of confusion between "monistic" Vedānta and "dualistic" Sāṁkhya notions (e.g., verses 70, 75, 83). However, even though it is probable that notions from several quarters have found their way into this text, their blending is far from arbitrary, but follows a consistent pattern. This pattern is formed by the notion that the world is a *māyā* of God = *Brahman* = the eternally free and unstained Soul.

Māyā means two things: on the one hand, the illusion according to which that which is unreal (viz., the world, the psyche, etc.) is real; in other words, mere ignorance (*avidyā*). On the other hand, it means the illusion which, like that created by the magician, is unreal *qua* illusion, yet real *qua* underlying reality (i.e., *Brahman*, etc. = the *ens commune*); so that *māyā* may be called "consisting of the *guṇas*" in verse 45, i.e., identical

with *prakṛti*. (The same applies to *avidyā* in 49.) However, those two meanings (which may be called "epistemological" or "gnoseological" on the one hand, and "ontological" on the other) are just two semantemes of one underlying idea, which is the exclusive reality of the *ens commune* (i.e., excluding both the latter's existentiality and the world's essentiality), as PS 57, 58, 74 demonstrate.

This idea should remind us of the Buddhist notions about the illusory character of the world, especially those of the Vijñānavādins and the school of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (which seems to stand in a Vijñānavāda tradition). Thus, I have quoted a RGV verse in explanation of PS 16, while the Self's characterization as *buddha*, etc., in PS 25 seems influenced by the fourth chapter of GK, which dates from Gauḍapāda's Buddhist period. (See Vetter, 1978.) I may also refer to *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* 6.8, which compares the "Perfect Quality of the Factors-of-Existence" (*dharmāṇāṁ pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇam*) to a clear crystal, which is erroneously held for something else if brought into contact with that thing. (See Frauwallner, 1969, p. 286.) Chronologically, too, it is quite likely that both Gauḍapāda and Ādiśeṣa, as early Advaita-Vedāntins, were strongly influenced by Buddhism. The Advaita-Vedānta which Ādiśeṣa teaches is not absolutist, but relativistic, hence may be called *Viśiṣṭādvaita* or *Bhedābhedādvaita*, i.e., it teaches that every *ens individuale* is both identical with (*qua ens*), and different from (*qua* illusion), the *ens commune*, which is God = *Brahman* = *Ātman*. (On probable Buddhist influence, see also note 45.)

That is also implied by another factor, viz., the emphasis we find in PS on *bhakti*, i.e., "participating devotion toward, and identification with, God." Originating from the BhG, the notion of *bhakti* presupposes the relative essentiality of the devotee, not only as a kind of "*pia fraus*" (in order to induce him to take

religious devotion seriously), but also because there would be no participation possible between an *ens participans* and an *ens participandum* without the precondition of each being an *ens*, and consequently the *ens commune*. (Cf. n. 102.) It is this admission of essentiality within existentiality, crucial to mysticism everywhere, which brought Thomas Aquinas on the verge of heresy, significantly because he was influenced in his ontology by Averroës, who stood himself in the tradition of the Islamic Šīʾa *taʾwīl*, i.e., the esoteric exegesis of God's word. (See Corbin, 1964, pp. 334 ff.) Although both Averroës and Saint Thomas went beyond the Neo-Platonist and Avicennean dictum that "*Ex Uno non fit nisi Unum*," and thereby became the precursors of modern Western philosophy (which, in a sense, culminated in the "political" metaphysics of Kant and Hegel), their ontological base was precisely in that essentially "oriental" (*mašraqīa*) dictum. The history of Šīʾa metaphysics, especially of Sufism, tries to mediate between "oriental" essentialism and "occidental" existentialism. Consequently, the contrast between Indian and Western metaphysics lies in the fact that the former identifies existence with essence, and the latter, essence with existence. The former thereby gains deliverance, the latter, physical dominance over the world.

One of the structural elements of Vedāntist philosophy, and one which is traditionally held to set it apart from other Indian schools of thought (particularly Buddhism), is that is claims as its authority the so-called "Vedānta tradition" (*Vedāntaśāstra*, PS 87), i.e., the doctrinal mass of the Upaniṣads. This raises a problem: since the latter embody spoken words, they belong to the world of illusion; hence, how can they teach deliverance? (Compare the question of whether the *Qorān* was created or not in early Islam.) The answer which R. gives *ad* PS 22 (cf. n. 76) is that the Upaniṣads put an end to illusion in the same manner as a

frightening lion which one sees in his dream does to this dream, or as a girl one sees in his dream constitutes a good omen for the "rites of gratification." (No women were allowed to carry out any ritual by themselves!) Nevertheless, that argument is not the exclusive prerogative of Brahmanic orthodoxy, as MSA 6.6-10 show: the Bodhisattva attains liberating insight by reflecting on the texts of the Buddhist doctrine, but after he has gained complete clarity about them, he recognizes the entire tradition as mere imagination. (See Frauwallner, 1969, pp. 314-5; cp. n. 102 below.)

Generally, such a conception characterizes the tradition in which it stands (regardless of its formal aspects) as an essentially *theosophical* one. For it manifests the *infinitum potentia*, which by itself cannot but become an *infinitum actu* (as we saw) in respect of a *philosophical diacrisis*, as the *ens commune* in respect of a *religious diacrisis* (to use the formula of Dionysius Areopagita), which makes its object fit for philosophical discourse by this very essentialism of existence. That is, in the last analysis, why Indian philosophy and religion both culminate in a single theosophy. At the same time, my translation of Indian concepts into the language of the Scholastics should have demonstrated beyond all doubt the difference between Indian religions, on the one hand, and monotheism (Jewish, Christian, Muslim), on the other: whereas the former equate religious with philosophical discourse, the latter can have no "ear" for any other than God's discourse, by which He created the universe.

The famous Kaśmīrian Śaiva philosopher Abhinavagupta, who flourished around 1010 A.D. (according to Potter, 1970), wrote another *Paramārthasāra*, which is in part nothing but a rewrite of Ādiśeṣa's text. It has been edited (virtually as a copy of J. C. Chatterji's edition in "Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies," Volume 7, 1916, where it was accompanied by Yogarājā's com-

mentary) by Liliane Silburn in 1957, as Fascicule 5 of the "Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne" (Paris). According to Miss Silburn, the *Ādhārakārikās* (i.e., the verses which form the *Paramārthasāra* by Ādiśeṣa, who is called "*Ādhāra*," i.e., "Support [of the words]," not only in our present PS, but also in Abhinavagupta's, where he, rather than the latter, is by implication identified as its author) "sont une œuvre de l'école Sāṁkhya." I think I have sufficiently demonstrated in the notes on my translation that, despite important Sāṁkhya elements (such as the doctrine about evolution from Primordial Matter by way of the "World Egg" in verse 10, and the "Inner Organs," "Pure Entities," "Sense Faculties," and "Great Elements" in verse 20, the implicit dualism of verse 70, etc.), the work as a whole belongs to a tradition of Vedānta, and one we may call *Bhedābhedādvaita*.

As for the information contained in those notes, the reader should never forget that, however interesting factual knowledge is, his reading should further his understanding about himself, his place in the world, and the manner in which he may find rest from the world's business. Knowledge should never be sought for its own sake, but always in order to liberate onself from the stress which results from attachment to the world. In this spirit, R. understands that, through the PS, "an intended action is thereby acknowledged, inasmuch as an inquiry into the truth about the Primordial Soul (*puruṣa*) and Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*) is here undertaken." (Commentary on verse 2, probably influenced by BS 1.1.1: *athāto brahmajijñāsā*, "Thence, the investigation into *Brahman*.") It is not without its charm to quote from R.'s commentary on the final verse the reasons which he finds to recommend this work for careful study: "This book should be studied by those who investigate into the truth for the following reasons: (1) it is based on the main instrument of knowledge [viz., the

Upaniṣad sentences; cf. n. 276 *ad* PS 87]; (2) it has been authored by the Lord, Ananta, who is permanently released [cf. n. 25 *ad* 8, 277 *ad* 87]; (3) it is an object of much veneration; (4) it has as its result "Separation" [of the soul from matter; cf. n. 234 *ad* 70, 262 *ad* 81]; (5) it has a pleasing style; (6) it is a book of moderate size."

Edition

Apart from some few mistakes and misprints, the text which Śrī Sūrya-Nārāyaṇa Śukla has presented us with is very satisfactory indeed. Less so, however, is the manner in which the many quotations from Vedic and Epic texts are assigned to their rightful *loci* in the commentary by Rāghavānanda. Here, I have felt obliged to check almost all of them in view of both the interest they hold generally and the importance they have for a correct understanding of the way this commentator understood the PS. They turned out to have been often wrongly attributed, either to a different place in the text quoted, or to an altogether different text; this was especially the case with Rigvedic verses. So we are once again confirmed in our suspicions about Indian philological skills: while the Indian Paṇḍits have, quite often, an amazing memory and quote whole passages, or at least "indicative" portions of such passages, from memory, they are also often inaccurate, particularly as regards titles and numbers.

I have refrained from giving a concordance between those verses in Ādiśeṣa's PS which were more or less freely copied by Abhinavagupta some five centuries later, because that work has already been undertaken by Miss Silburn in the notes on her translation of Abhinava's work.

I want to thank Dr. Tilmann Vetter, Professor of Indian Philosophy, Buddhism, and Tibetan at the University of Leiden,

most warmly for the unflinching way in which he helped and encouraged me while this work was in progress. I also like to thank Dr. Franciscus Kuiper, Emeritus Professor of Vedic and Sanskrit at the same university, and his wife, since it was their constant friendship and personal encouragement which steadied my frayed nerves throughout the years. It is only fair to say, moreover, that two articles by them, more than anything else, helped to shape my understanding of Indian thought. These are: "Cosmogony and Conception: A Query," by Kuiper (*History of Religions*, Vol. 10, No. 2, November, 1970, pp. 91-138; listed in the Bibliography, below), in which he correlated Yogic experiences as well as the vision of the Vedic poets with an anamnesis of prenatal and preconceptional events; and "Erfahrung des Unerfahrbaren bei Śaṅkara," by Vetter (G. Oberhammer, ed., *Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils: Das Problem in indischer und christlicher Tradition*, Vienna, 1978, pp. 45-59), in which Śaṁkara's doctrine about mystical experience is put forward in a very consistent and clear way. A third such "keystone" of my thinking has been an article by Lambert Schmithausen, "Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus" (*Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*, Münster, 1973, No. 3, pp. 161-86), which I should recommend to everyone interested in Indian philosophy. Finally, my understanding of the PS has been greatly enhanced by constant reference to the many fine expositions of philosophical and theological problems by the late Erich Przywara SJ in *Analogia Entis* (listed in the Bibliography); it is my conviction that the latter work will sooner or later be instrumental in a revival of philosophy, to which Indian philosophy will no doubt contribute from yet another quarter. Readers who want to delve more deeply into the problems posed by Vedānta metaphysics and soteriology than they may with help from the

present book, should turn to the latest book by T. Vetter, *Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras* (Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, Vol. VI; Vienna: Gerold/Leiden: Brill/Delhi: Banarsidass, 1979).

TEXT AND TRANSLATION

PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

(1) paraṁ parasyāḥ prakṛter anādim ekaṁ niviṣṭaṁ bahudhā guhāsu /
sarvālayaṁ sarvacarācarasthaṁ tvām eva viṣṇuṁ śaraṇaṁ prapadye //

(2) ātmāmburāśau nikhilo 'pi loko magno 'pi nācāmati nekṣate ca /
āścaryam etan mṛgatṛṣṇikābhe bhavāmburāśau ramate mṛṣaiva //

(3) garbhagṛhavāsasaṁbhavajanmajarāmaraṇaviprayogābdhau /
jagad ālokya nimagnaṁ prāha guruṁ prāñjaliḥ śiṣyaḥ //

(4) tvaṁ sāṅgavedavettā bhettā saṁśayagaṇasya ṛtavaktā /
saṁsārārṇavataraṇapraśnaṁ pṛcchāmy ahaṁ bhagavan //

(5) dīrghe 'smin saṁsāre saṁsarataḥ kasya kena saṁbandhaḥ /
karma śubhāśubhaphaladam anubhavati gatāgatair iha kaḥ //

(6) karmaguṇajālabaddho jīvaḥ saṁsarati kośakāra iva /
mohāndhakāragahanāt tasya kathaṁ bandhanān mokṣaḥ //

(7) guṇapuruṣavibhāgajñe dharmādharmau na bandhakau bhavataḥ /
iti gaditapūrvavākyaiḥ prakṛtiṁ puruṣaṁ ca me brūhi //

(8) ity ādhāro bhagavān pṛṣṭaḥ śiṣyeṇa taṁ sa hovāca /
viduṣām apy atigahanaṁ vaktavyam idaṁ śṛṇu tathāpi tvam //

THE ESSENCE OF SUPREME TRUTH

(1) I take refuge in Thee alone, who art Viṣṇu: superior[1] to the supreme Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*), without beginning, one,[2] multifariously present[3] in the hearts,[4] the support of everything,[5] immanent in everything mobile and immobile.

(2) The whole world, though submerged in the ocean of the Self (*ātman*), neither drinks from nor looks at it. It is a mystery that [the world] just blindly lusts for the ocean of existences, which is like a mirage.[6]

(3) The student, on looking down upon the world as being submerged in the ocean of getting[7] to live in the womb's abode, of birth, old age, death, and separation, said[8] to the Teacher (*guru*), while making obeisance with his hands:[9]

(4) "Thou knowest the *Vedas*[10] together with their *Aṅgas*,[11] resolvest the multitude of doubts, and speakest the truth (*ṛta*).[12] Thee, O Lord, I ask the question of how to cross the ocean of Transmigration (*saṁsāra*).

(5) "Who is he who transmigrates in this[13] long[14] Transmigration, and by what is he connected [to it]? Who experiences here,[15] through comings and goings,[16] the Act (*karman*) which gives pure and impure results?[17]

(6) "The Soul (*jīva*), bound by the net[18] of Acts and Qualities (*guṇa*),[19] is in Transmigration like a chrysalis [in its cocoon].[20] How is it to be delivered (*mokṣa*) from bondage, which it is hard to penetrate because of the darkness [consisting] of Delusion (*moha*)?[21]

(7) "Merit (*dharma*) and Demerit (*adharma*)[22] do not bind him who knows the distinction between the Qualities and the Soul (*puruṣa*).[23] In accordance with [these] sentences, as pronounced in the foregoing,[24] explain to me Primordial Matter and Soul!"

(8) The Master, Ādhāra,[25] questioned thus by the student, said to him: Although that which is to be said [about this] in the following is very hard to penetrate into even for those who have knowledge, do you hear it nevertheless!

(9) satyam iva jagad asatyaṁ mūlaprakṛter idaṁ kṛtaṁ yena /
tam praṇipatyopendraṁ vakṣye paramārthasāram idam //

(10) avyaktād aṇḍam abhūd aṇḍād brahmā tataḥ prajāsargaḥ /
māyāmayī pravṛttiḥ saṁhriyata iyaṁ punaḥ kramaśaḥ //

(11) māyāmayo 'py acetā guṇakaraṇagaṇaḥ karoti karmāṇi /
tadadhiṣṭhātā dehī sacetano 'pi na karoti kiṁcid api //

(12) yadvad acetanam api san nikaṭasthe bhrāmake bhramati loham /
tadvat karaṇasamūhaś ceṣṭati cidadhiṣṭhite dehe //

(13) yadvat savitary udite karoti karmāṇi jīvaloko 'yam /
na ca tāni karoti ravir na kārayati tadvad ātmāpi //

(14) manaso 'haṁkāravimūrcchitasya caitanyabodhitasyeha /
puruṣābhimānasukhaduḥkhabhāvanā bhavati mūḍhasya //

(15) kartā bhoktā draṣṭāsmi karmaṇām uttamādīnām /
iti tat svabhāvavimalo 'bhimanyate sarvago 'py ātmā //

(16) nānāvidhavarṇānāṁ varṇaṁ dhatte yathāmalaḥ sphaṭikaḥ /
tadvad upādher guṇabhāvitasya bhāvaṁ vibhur dhatte //

(9) I shall propound this "Essence of Supreme Truth" (*Paramārthasāra*), after making obeisance to that Upendra [= Viṣṇu],[26] by whom this unreal[27] world was made from Primordial Matter as something seemingly real.[28]

(10) From the Unmanifest (*avyakta*),[29] there came into being an Egg (*aṇḍa*);[30] from the Egg, Brahmā;[31] from Him, [all] creatures sprang.[32] [Then] this Manifestation (*pravṛtti*), which consists of Magic (*māyā*),[33] is absorbed back again in [reverse] order.[34]

(11) The assembly of Qualities and Organs (*karaṇa*),[35] although illusory [and] unspiritual, accomplishes [all][36] acts. The Embodied [Soul] (*dehin*),[37] which is the former's ruler,[38] accomplishes nothing at all,[39] although it is spiritual.[40]

(12) Just as iron moves if a magnet is close, although it is unspiritual,[41] in the same way the assembly of the organs[42] moves, if the body is ruled by the Spirit (*cit*).[43]

(13) Just as, when the sun has risen, this world of living beings (*jīvaloka*) performs acts, yet[44] the sun does not perform them or have them performed, so [neither does] the Self.[45]

(14) The Inner Organ (*manas*),[46] filled with ego consciousness[47] (*ahaṁkāra-vimūrcchita*), unspiritual (*mūḍha*),[48] [but seemingly] made spiritual by the Spirit [= Soul] (*caitanya-bodhita*),[49] here[50] identifies itself with the soul and imputes to it [its own characteristics, viz.] pleasure and sorrow.[51]

(15) Therefore, although the Self is all-pervasive and by its nature free from impurities, it is wrongly considered [as follows]: "I am the one who performs, experiences, and views acts from the highest ones [i.e., Vedic rites][52] downward."[53]

(16) As a spotless crystal adopts the colour of variously coloured things [nearby], just so the All-Pervasive [Self] (*vibhu*)[54] adopts the state [viz., divinity, humanity, etc.] of an *Upādhi*[55] created by the Qualities (*guṇa*).[56]

(17) gacchati gacchati salile dinakarabimbaṁ sthite sthitiṁ yāti /
antaḥkaraṇe gacchati gacchaty ātmāpi tadvad iha //

(18) rāhur adṛśyo 'pi yathā śaśibimbasthaḥ prakāśate jagati /
sarvagato 'pi tathātmā buddhistho dṛśyatām eti //

(19) sarvagataṁ nirupamam advaitaṁ tac cetasā gamyam /
yad buddhigataṁ brahmopalabhyate śiṣya bodhyaṁ tat //

(20) buddhimano'haṁkārās tanmātrendriyagaṇāś ca bhūtagaṇaḥ /
saṁsārasargaparirakṣaṇakṣamāḥ prākṛtāḥ heyāḥ //

(21) dharmādharmau sukhaduḥkhakalpanā svarganarakavāsaś ca /
utpattinidhanavarṇāśramā na santīha paramārthe //

(22) mṛgatṛṣṇāyām udakaṁ śuktau rajataṁ bhujaṁgamo rajjvām /
taimirikacandrayugavad bhrāntaṁ nikhilaṁ jagadrūpam //

(23) yadvad dinakara eko vibhāti salilāśayeṣu sarveṣu /
tadvat sakalopādhiṣv avasthito bhāti paramātmā //

(24) kham iva ghaṭādiṣv antar bahiḥ sthitaṁ brahma sarvapiṇḍeṣu /
dehe 'ham ity anātmani buddhiḥ saṁsārabandhāya //

(17) A reflection of the sun in the sea moves or comes to a standstill as the sea moves or comes to rest: the Self,[57] too, moves likewise here as the Inner Organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*)[58] moves.[59]

(18) As Rāhu,[60] though invisible, becomes visible on earth, if [and insofar as] he is situated at the moon disk, so the Self, though all-pervasive, becomes visible,[61] if [and insofar as] it is situated in [the Inner Organ here called] *Buddhi*.[62]

(19) That *Brahman* which is preceived as present in the *Buddhi* must be understood as all-pervasive, unequalled,[63] and without multiplicity[64] by the mind (*cetas*):[65] that must be known, O student!

(20) *Buddhi*,[66] *Manas*,[67] Ego Consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*),[68] and the assemblies of Pure Entities (*tanmātra*)[69] and of Sense Faculties (*indriya*),[70] [as well as] the assembly of the [Great] Elements ([*mahā-*] *bhūta*),[71] must be rejected, [because,] being derived from Primordial Matter (*prākṛta*),[72] they are capable of creating and maintaining transmigration.

(21) Merit and Demerit,[73] the imagining of pleasure and sorrow, and the residing in heaven or hell, birth, death, caste (*varṇa*), and social life stage (*āśrama*) do not exist[74] in this absolutely real (*iha paramārthe*)[75] [Self, but they do exist in the Self's reflected image in the Inner Organ].

(22) The entire appearance of [the Self as] the world is erroneous,[76] like water [appearing] in a mirage,[77] silver in mother-of-pearl, a snake in a rope,[78] or two moons in someone ill with *Timira*.[79]

(23) Just as the one sun appears [as present] in all water reservoirs [and hence as many suns], so the Supreme Self (*paramātman*)[80] appears as present in all *Upādhis*[81] [and hence as many selves].

(24) *Brahman* [which is limited only by illusion, but is unlimited in reality][82] is present in all bodies (*piṇḍa*),[83] both inside and outside,[84] as space [though unlimited, is present both inside and outside of] jars, etc.[85] The idea (*buddhi*) of an "ego" (*aham iti*) relative to the body (*deha*), which is not the Self (*anātman*), [makes] for bondage to transmigration.

(25) sarvavikalpanahīnaḥ śuddho buddho 'jarāmaraḥ śāntaḥ /
amalaḥ sakṛd vibhātaś cetana ātmā khavad vyāpī //

(26) rasaphāṇitaśarkarikāguḍakhaṇḍā vikṛtayo yathaivekṣoḥ /
tadvad avasthābhedāḥ paramātmany eva bahurūpāḥ //

(27) vijñānāntaryāmiprāṇavirāḍdehajātipiṇḍāntāḥ /
vyavahārās tasyātmany ete 'vasthāviśeṣāḥ syuḥ //

(28) rajjvāṁ nāsti bhujaṁgaḥ sarpabhayaṁ bhavati hetunā kena /
tadvad dvaitavikalpabhrāntir avidyā na satyam idam //

(29) etat tad andhakāraṁ yad anātmany ātmatā bhrāntyā /
na vidanti vāsudevaṁ sarvātmānaṁ narā mūḍhāḥ //

(30) prāṇādyanantabhedair ātmānaṁ saṁvitatya jālam iva /
saṁharati vāsudevaḥ svavibhūtyā krīḍamāna iva //

(31) tribhir eva viśvataijasaprājñais tair ādimadhyanidhanākhyaiḥ /
jāgratsvapnasuṣuptair bhramabhūtaiś chāditaṁ turyam //

(32) mohayatīvātmānaṁ svamāyayā dvaitarūpayā devaḥ /
upalabhate svayam evaṁ guhāgataṁ puruṣam ātmānam //

(25) The Self (*ātman*) is devoid of all concepts (*vikalpana*), pure, [always and forever] waked (or, illuminated: *buddha*),[86] unageing, immortal,[87] calm, spotless, having appeared once [and forever],[88] spiritual (*cetana*),[89] [and] pervasive, like space.[90]

(26) As there are [various] modifications of [one and] the same[91] sugar cane, viz., juice, condensate, ground sugar, treacle, and candy, so there are different states, [manifesting themselves] in many forms, in the [one and] same Supreme Self.[92]

(27) The latter's names[93] [in the Veda][94] are: [(1)] Knowledge (*vijñāna*);[95] [(2)] Inner Controller (*antaryāmin*);[96] [(3)] Breath (*prāṇa*);[97] [(4)] Sovereign Body (*virāḍ-deha*);[98] finally, [(5)] the [individual] Lumps (*piṇḍa*) [i.e., bodies,[99] belonging to a particular] species.[100] Those [five categories] may be particular states[101] in the Self.[102]

(28) There is no snake in a rope:[103] for what reason is there fear of a snake? Similarly [to the error of assuming a snake], the erroneous concept (*vikalpa-bhrānti*)[104] of plurality (*dvaita*)[105] [in the Self is unfounded and mere] Ignorance (*avidyā*);[106] that [plurality] is not true.

(29) This is "darkness,"[107] viz., [for] the fact of being the Self [to be wrongly attributed] to what is not the Self.[108] Deluded by [this] error,[109] people do not recognize Vāsudeva [= Viṣṇu][110] as the Self of everything.[111]

(30) After having extended himself[112] through infinite varieties,[113] viz., breath,[114] etc., like [a feat of] magic,[115] Vāsudeva, by his own sovereignty,[116] reabsorbs [everything] as if playing.[117]

(31) The Fourth One (*turya*)[118] is hidden by the three states alike[119] of being awake,[120] dreaming,[121] and deep sleep[122]—which are errors[123]—, designated as beginning, middle, and end[124] [respectively, while commonly known as] Viśva,[125] Taijasa,[126] and Prājña[127] [respectively].[128]

(32) God[129] deludes himself,[130] as it were, by his own Magic (*māyā*),[131] which consists of plurality (*dvaita*),[132] and thus perceives himself as the [individual] soul (*puruṣa*)[133] present in the heart.[134]

(33) As a variety of forms appears in the sky because of smoke rising from fire, so creation, expanded into multiplicity,[135] appears in Viṣṇu by his own Magic.

(34) In the usual conception,[136] yet not according to supreme reality, the Lord is, as it were, calm, if the Inner Organ (*manas*) is calm, is, as it were, joyed, if the Inner Organ is joyed, is, as it were, deluded, if the Inner Organ is deluded.[137]

(35) As the expanse of the sky is not soiled by clouds or by smoke going upward, so the supreme Soul (*puruṣa*) is not touched by the modifications (*vikāra*)[138] of Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*).

(36) Just as, even if one jar is filled with impurities, viz., smoke, etc., others are not attained by impurities, so [it is with] the Soul (*jīva*), too, in this case.[139]

(37) The Qualities (*guṇa*),[140] constrained within the body and the sense faculties, perform action for the sake of their own experience. Action does not bind at all those who know: "I am not a doer, that is not mine."[141]

(38) We may well assume that action by which a body has originated was committed by another [i.e., a previous][142] body. This [action, committed by that previous body,][143] must inevitably be experienced; its destruction is taught [to result] only from its experience.

(39) That action which, amassed [in the present body][144] prior to the rise of knowledge, is lapped by the flames of the fire of knowledge,[145] is incapable of [producing a new][146] birth, like a seed burned by fire.

(40) That action which is performed after the creation of knowledge, likewise[147] does not attach to the performer, any more than water to a lotus leaf.[148]

(41) The wise proclaim that here [among embodied beings][149] the mass of actions is performed by speech, body, and mind. I am not one of these,[150] however, nor do I perform their actions.

(42) From the destruction of the seed[151] of the result of an action [there results] the destruction of [re-]birth; and there is no doubt as to that.

(43) yadvad iṣīkātūlaṁ pavanoddhūtaṁ hi daśa diśo yāti /
brahmaṇi tattvajñānāt tathaiva karmāṇi tattvavidaḥ //

(44) kṣīrād uddhṛtam ājyaṁ kṣiptaṁ yadvan na pūrvavat tasmin /
prakṛtiguṇebhyas tadvat pṛthakkṛtaś cetano nātmā //

(45) guṇamayamāyāgahanaṁ nirdhūya yathā tamaḥ sahasrāṁśuḥ /
bāhyābhyantaracārī saindhavaghanavad bhavet puruṣaḥ //

(46) yadvad deho 'vayavā mṛd eva tasya vikārajātāni /
tadvat sthāvarajaṅgamam advaitaṁ dvaitavad bhāti //

(47) ekasmāt kṣetrajñād bahvyaḥ kṣetrajñajātayo jātāḥ /
lohagatād iva dahanāt samantato viṣphuliṅgagaṇāḥ //

(48) te guṇasaṁgamadoṣād baddhā iva dhānyajātayaḥ svatuṣaiḥ /
janma labhante tāvad yāvan na jñānavahninā dagdhāḥ //

(49) triguṇā caitanyātmani sarvagate 'vasthite 'khilādhāre /
kurute sṛṣṭim avidyā sarvatra spṛśyate tayā nātmā //

(50) rajjvāṁ bhujaṁgahetuḥ prabhavavināśau yathā na staḥ /
jagadutpattivināśau na ca kāraṇam asti tadvad iha //

If one has recognized this, one becomes free of darkness, and shines, naturally splendid,[152] like the sun.

(43) For, as the tuft of a reed, disturbed by wind, goes in ten directions, so, too, [go] the acts of him who knows the truth, by knowledge of truth in respect of *Brahman*.[153]

(44) Just as clarified butter, drawn from milk, is not in that [milk] as before, if it is cast [back into it], so the spiritual Self, if it has [once] been separated from the Qualities[154] of Primordial Matter, is not [together with these any longer].[155]

(45) After destroying the impenetrable darkness[156] of Magic (*māyā*), formed by the Qualities, as the thousand-rayed [sun destroys] the darkness [of the night], the Soul (*puruṣa*) will be active both outside and inside [the body],[157] as a lump of salt [once dissolved in water, is no longer restricted to its original size].[158]

(46) Just as the limbs are the body, and as the modified products of clay are just clay, so the immobile and mobile world, which is without multiplicity (*advaita*), appears as multiplicity (*dvaita*).[159]

(47) From the one knower of the field[160] there are born many species of field knowers,[161] just as from the fire in [red-hot] iron showers of sparks [emanate] in all directions.[162]

(48) They are bound, as it were, by the fault of commingling with the Qualities, [like][163] specific grains, [which are bound] by their husks. They acquire [re-]birth, until they are burned by the fire of knowledge (*jñāna-vahni*).[164]

(49) Ignorance (*avidyā*), having three Qualities,[165] effectuates creation everywhere inside the Self, which is spiritual, all-pervasive, continual, the support of everything;[166] the Self is not touched by that [Ignorance].[167]

(50) Just as there is in a rope neither cause for a snake nor [its] origination or destruction, so there is here [i.e., in this Self] neither the world's origination or destruction, nor [its] cause.[168]

(51) janmavināśanagamanāgamamalasaṁbandhavarjito nityam /
ākāśa iva ghaṭādiṣu sarvātmā sarvadopetaḥ //

(52) karmaśubhāśubhaphalasukhaduḥkhair yogo bhavaty upādhīnām /
tatsaṁsargād bandhas taskarasaṁgād ataskaravat //

(53) dehaguṇakaraṇagocarasaṁgāt puruṣasya yāvad iha bhāvaḥ /
tāvan māyāpāśaiḥ saṁsāre baddha iva bhāti //

(54) mātṛpitṛputrabāndhavadhanabhogavibhāgasaṁmūḍhaḥ /
janmajarāmaraṇamaye cakra iva bhrāmyate jantuḥ //

(55) lokavyavahārakṛtāṁ ya ihāvidyām upāsate mūḍhāḥ /
te jananamaraṇadharmāṇo 'ndhaṁ tama etya khidyante //

(56) himaphenabudbudā iva jalasya dhūmo yathā vahneḥ /
tadvat svabhāvabhūtā māyaiṣā kīrtitā viṣṇoḥ //

(57) evaṁ dvaitavikalpāṁ bhramasvarūpāṁ vimohanīṁ māyām /
utsṛjya sakalaniṣkalam advaitaṁ bhāvayed brahma //

(51) The Self of all, which is permanently free of a connection to birth [and] destruction, to coming [and] going, [and] to the impurities,[169] is ever [seemingly][170] connected [to birth, destruction, etc.], like the ether in jars, etc. [in that the ether seems to be connected to the latter's origination, destruction, etc., although it is not really connected to these].[171]

(52) The *Upādhis* [i.e., the body and the organs][172] are connected to actions and to pleasure and sorrow, which are the pleasant and unpleasant results [of those actions].[173] Bondage [stems] from connection with those [*Upādhis*], just as someone who is not a thief [is caught] because he is in the company of thieves.

(53) As long as the Soul (*puruṣa*) exists here [in this body] because of its bondage to body, qualities, organs, and sense objects,[174] so long does it appear, by the fetters of Magic, as if tied to the Process of Rebirth (*saṁsāra*).[175]

(54) Perplexed by [the idea of] having a particular mother and father and particular sons, relatives, wealth, and enjoyments, man[176] is reeling around in [the Cycle of Transmigration],[177] which consists of birth, old age, and death, as in a wheel.[178]

(55) Those perplexed ones who abide here in Ignorance, which is caused by the usual conception of the world,[179] suffer when they have entered into blind darkness,[180] [because] they are bound to birth and death.

(56) Just as snow,[181] foam, and bubbles [form out of the own nature][182] of water, and as smoke [forms out of the own nature] of fire,[183] so is this Magic (*māyā*) of Viṣṇu reputed[184] to have originated from his own nature.[185]

(57) After one has thus discarded Illusion (*māyā*), which, being delusive, has the nature of fallacy[186] [in that it produces] the idea of plurality, let him realize *Brahman*, which is without plurality,[187] being both with and without parts.[188]

(58) yadvat salile salilaṁ kṣīre ksīraṁ samīraṇe vāyuḥ /
tadvad brahmaṇi vimale bhāvanayā tanmayatvam upayāti //

(59) itthaṁ dvaitasamūhe bhāvanayā brahmabhūyam upayāte /
ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ sarvaṁ brahmāvalokayataḥ //

(60) vigatopādhiḥ sphaṭikaḥ svaprabhayā bhāti nirmalo yadvat /
ciddīpaḥ svaprabhayā tathā vibhātīha nirupādhiḥ //

(61) guṇagaṇakaraṇaśarīraprāṇais tanmātrajātisukhaduḥkhaiḥ /
aparāmṛṣṭo vyāpī cidrūpo 'yaṁ sadā vimalaḥ //

(62) draṣṭā śrotā ghrātā sparśayitā rasayitā grahītā ca /
dehī dehendriyadhīvivarjitaḥ syān na kartāsau //

(63) eko naikatrāvasthito 'ham aiśvaryayogato vyāptaḥ /
ākāśavad akhilam idaṁ na kaścid apy atra saṁdehaḥ //

(64) ātmaivedaṁ sarvaṁ niṣkalasakalaṁ yadaiva bhāvayati /
mohagahanād viyuktas tadaiva parameśvarībhūtaḥ //

(65) yad yat siddhāntāgamatarkeṣu prabruvanti rāgāndhāḥ /
anumodāmas tat tat teṣāṁ sarvātmavādadhiyā //

(66) sarvākāro bhagavān upāsyate yena yena bhāvena /
taṁ taṁ bhāvaṁ bhūtvā cintāmaṇivat samabhyeti //

(58) As water[189] becomes one with water,[190] milk[191] with milk,[192] wind[193] with wind,[194] so, by meditation on the spotless[195] *Brahman*, [man] becomes one with it.

(59) If, in that way, the sum total of plurality has receded into the state of *Brahman* by meditation, no delusion, no sorrow [remains] for him, as he looks on everything as *Brahman*.[196]

(60) Just as a spotless crystal shines by its own splendour, once [its] *Upādhis*[197] have been removed, so does here [in the body] the light of the Spirit (*cit*) shine by its own splendour, [as soon as it is observed][198] without [its] *Upādhis* [viz., body and organs].[199]

(61) This [Self] is untouched by the assembly of the Qualities,[200] by the organ,[201] the body,[202] breaths,[203] Pure Elements (*tanmātra*),[204] genera,[205] pleasures,[206] [or] sorrows,[207] is all-pervasive, has the Spirit for its nature,[208] [and] is spotless forever.

(62) [The Self, insofar as][209] it has a body, is someone who sees, hears, smells, touches, tastes, and apprehends.[210] [However, insofar as][211] it is free of body, sense faculties, and thought (*dhī*) [i.e., the Inner Organ],[212] that [same Self][213] cannot be an agent [of vision, etc.].

(63) I (*aham*) [am] one, not fixed in one place, [but,] due to my sovereignty,[214] pervading this all[215] like the ether (*ākāśa*). [There is] not a single doubt as to this, [viz.,

(64) the fact that] this all is only the Self.[216] Only when one realizes [this Self] as both having and not having parts,[217] does one become free from the impenetrable darkness of Delusion (*moha*),[218] and become Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*)[219] at the same time.[220]

(65) We consent to whatever [others], who are blind with greed,[221] proclaim in [their] *Siddhāntas*,[222] *Āgamas*,[223] and *Tarkas*,[224] since all that [testifies to the orientation of] their tought toward [our] doctrine, according to which everything is the Self.[225]

(66) By whichever appearance (*bhāva*) the Lord, who has all forms, is meditated upon, that appearance he adopts,[226] as he is like a jewel [fulfilling all] wishes.

(67) nārāyaṇam ātmānaṁ jñātvā sargasthitipralayahetum /
sarvajñaḥ sarvagataḥ sarvaḥ sarveśvaro bhavati //

(68) ātmajñas tarati śucaṁ yasmād vidvān bibheti na kutaścit /
mṛtyor api maraṇabhayaṁ na bhavaty anyat kutas tasya //

(69) kṣayavṛddhivadhyaghātakabandhanamokṣair vivarjitaṁ nityam /
paramārthatattvam etad yad ato 'nyat tad anṛtaṁ sarvam //

(70) evaṁ prakṛtiṁ puruṣaṁ vijñāya nirastakalpanājālaḥ /
ātmārāmaḥ praśamaṁ samāsthitaḥ kevalībhavati //

(71) nalakadaliveṇuvāṇā naśyanti yathā svapuṣpam āsādya /
tadvat svabhāvabhūtāḥ svabhāvatāṁ prāpya naśyanti //

(72) bhinne 'jñānagranthau chinne saṁśayagaṇe śubhe kṣīṇe /
dagdhe ca janmabīje paramātmānaṁ hariṁ yāti //

(73) mokṣasya naiva kiṁcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra /
ajñānamayagranther bhedo yas taṁ vidur mokṣam //

(74) buddhvaivam asatyam idaṁ viṣṇor māyātmakaṁ jagadrūpam /
vigatadvandvopādhikabhogāsaṁgo bhavec chāntaḥ //

(75) buddhvā vibhaktāṁ prakṛtiṁ puruṣaḥ saṁsāramadhyago bhavati /
nirmuktaḥ sarvakarmabhir ambujapattraṁ yathā salilaiḥ //

(67) By recognizing Nārāyaṇa [= Viṣṇu], who is the cause of emanation, subsistence, and dissolution, as [one's] Self, everyone becomes omniscient, all-pervasive, [and] Lord of everything.[227]

(68) He who knows the Self transcends [all] sorrow.[228] Because the wise fears nothing, [not] even death,[229] there is no fear of dying. [And] whence [might] he have another [fear]?[230]

(69) That which is permanently devoid of destruction [and] growth, being killed [and] killing, bondage [and] liberation, is Supreme Reality (*paramārthatattva*). All that is different from it is untrue (*anṛta*).[231]

(70) Thus having distinctly recognized Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*) and Soul (*puruṣa*),[232] one is free from the net of imagination,[233] takes [no longer] pleasure in [anything except one's] Self, has reached quietude (*praśama*), and becomes "separated" (*kevala*) [from Matter once and for all in the moment of death, so one cannot be reborn].[234]

(71) As reed, plantain tree, bamboo, and cane are exhausted upon producing their own flower, so are [things which, like a body, etc.,] stem from their own nature, exhausted on reaching [awareness on the part of man of] the fact that they are [merely] their own nature.[235]

(72) When the fetter of ignorance (*ajñāna*)[236] is broken,[237] the host of doubts[238] cut, [not only impure, but also][239] pure [action][240] destroyed, and the seed of rebirth burned,[241] one goes to the Supreme Self (*paramātman*), to Hari [= Viṣṇu].[242]

(73) There is neither any place[243] for Release (*mokṣa*), nor [does Release consist in] going elsewhere. Breaking the fetter which consists of ignorance:[244] that is what one knows as Release.[245]

(74) If one has thus recognized this unreality (*asatya*), which consists of Viṣṇu's Magic (*māyā*) [and] has the form of the world,[246] one will become tranquil (*śānta*), having lost attachment to experience, which has for its condition [the imagined existence of] contrasts [e.g., between warm and cold, light and dark, etc.].[247]

(75) As [soon as] the Soul (*puruṣa*) has understood Matter (*prakṛti*) as different [from itself],[248] it becomes, [even though it still] exists in the

(76) aśnan yadvā tadvā saṁvīto yena kenacic chāntaḥ /
yatra kvacana ca śāyī vimucyate sarvabhūtātmā //

(77) hayamedhasahasrāṇy apy atha kurute brahmaghātalakṣāṇi /
paramārthavin na puṇyair na ca pāpaiḥ spṛśyate vimalaḥ //

(78) madakopaharṣamatsaraviṣādabhayaparuṣavarjy avāgbuddhiḥ /
niḥstotravaṣaṭkāro jaḍavad vicared agādhamatiḥ //

(79) utpattināśavarjitam evaṁ paramārtham upalabhya /
kṛtakṛtyasaphalajanmā sarvagatas tiṣṭhati yatheṣṭam //

(80) vyāpinam abhinnam itthaṁ sarvātmānaṁ vidhūtanānātvam /
nirupamaparamānandaṁ yo veda sa tanmayo bhavati //

(81) tīrthe śvapacagṛhe vā naṣṭasmṛtir api parityajan deham /
jñānasamakālamuktaḥ kaivalyaṁ yāti hataśokaḥ //

(82) puṇyāya tīrthasevā nirayāya śvapacasadananidhanagatiḥ /
puṇyāpuṇyakalaṁkasparśābhāve tu kiṁ tena //

(83) vṛkṣāgrāc cyutapādo yadvad anicchan naraḥ kṣitau patati /
tadvad guṇapuruṣajño 'nicchann api kevalībhavati //

midst of Transmigration (*saṁsāra*), free from all acts,[249] as a lotus leaf [is free] from the water [in which grows the lotus plant].[250]

(76) He who [has become][251] the Self of all beings [and thereby become][252] tranquil, is released, whatever he eats, in whatever he dresses, and wherever he couches.

(77) Whether he performs 1,000s of Horse Sacrifices, or kills 100,000s of Brahmins, he is not, knowing Supreme Truth, touched by either meritorious or evil [acts, as he is] spotless.[253]

(78) His mind (*mati*) unfathomable, let him behave like a fool (*jaḍa*), discarding arrogance, anger, joy, jealousy, despondency, fear, [and] harshness, being without speech [and] mental organ (*buddhi*), not issuing any laud (*stotra*) [or] incantation (*vaṣaṭkāra*).[254]

(79) Having thus grasped Supreme Truth, which is free of origination and destruction, [and] having done what had to be done,[255] [and in that way having brought his][256] existence to fruition, he stays as he pleases, universally present.

(80) He who knows the Self of everything, thus revealed,[257] as pervasive,[258] free from diversity,[259] incomparable, supreme bliss,[260] becomes one with it.

(81) [Because he has already been] released at the very time knowledge [produced itself],[261] he goes toward "Separation" (*kaivalya*)[262]—sorrow having been destroyed—, when he departs the body, even while [suffering from] loss of consciousness [i.e., even if he no longer thinks about Viṣṇu,[263] staying] in either a place of pilgrimage, or the [unclean] house of a dog eater.

(82) Visiting holy places [to die there is][264] for one's good, dying in the home of a dog eater, for one's evil. Yet what is the point in this, if one cannot be touched by the stains of good and evil?[265]

(83) Just as a man falls to the ground from the top of a tree involuntarily, if he has lost his foothold, similarly, someone who knows the Qualities (*guṇa*) and the Soul (*puruṣa*)[266] becomes "separate" (*kevala*),[267] even involuntarily.[268]

(84) paramārthamārgasādhanam ārabhyāprāpya yogam api nāma /
suralokabhogabhogī muditamanā modate suciram //

(85) viṣayeṣu sārvabhaumaḥ sarvajanaiḥ pūjyate yathā rājā /
bhuvaneṣu sarvadevair yogabhraṣṭas tathā pūjyaḥ //

(86) mahatā kālena mahān mānuṣyaṁ prāpya yogam abhyasya /
prāpnoti divyam amṛtaṁ yat tat paramaṁ padaṁ viṣṇoḥ //

(87) vedāntaśāstram akhilaṁ vilokya śeṣas tu jagadādhāraḥ /
āryapañcāśītyā babandha paramārthasāram idam //

// iti paramārthasāraṁ samāptam //

(84) Even if he, after undertaking to follow the road to Supreme Truth, does not reach [mystic] Union (*yoga*)[269] [with the Supreme Being], he enjoys himself with gladdenend mind for a very long time, taking part in the joys of the worlds of the gods.

(85) Just as a king of the entire earth is worshipped in his realms by all people, so ought someone who has [striven toward, but] not succeeded in [mystic] Union to be worshipped in the [heavenly] realms by all gods.

(86) Having [again][270] obtained the human state after a long time,[271] [and] concentrating [again] on [mystic] Union,[272] [that] Great One[273] [thereupon] reaches that supreme place of Viṣṇu,[274] which is divine[275] [and] immortal.

(87) After considering the entire Doctrine of *Vedānta*[276] [i.e., the *Upaniṣads*, Ādi-]Śeṣa,[277] the support of the worlds, has put together this "Essence of Supreme Truth" in 85 *Āryā* [verses].

Thus is completed the "Essence of Supreme Truth."

NOTES

[1] On the qualifications of God, who is the Soul, as expressed by PS 1, see the Introduction, above. R. quotes KaṭhU 3.11b-d on the qualification of "superior": "Higher than the Unmanifest [= *Prakṛti*] is *Puruṣa*, nothing is higher than *Puruṣa*; this is the limit, this the highest goal." Those are the three *pādas* R. omits in his gloss on PS 53. (Cf. n. 174 below.)

[2] R. wonders: If God is one, how can Matter be one? For we read in ŚvU 4.5 that *Prakṛti* is "one, unborn, red, white, and black, emitting many creatures of its form." No contradiction is possible between a God who is one, and Matter which is one, if that means that both are different from each other. This seems to be the intention not only of this opening verse, but of the student's questions in PS 4-7 as well. R. explains the dualistic theory as follows: Whereas Matter is one and supreme, the Soul = God is one in the sense that it is autonomous, because it is spiritual (which Matter is not), and therefore superior. He also quotes MNU 2 to this effect: "Then, the permanent Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa," etc. On the Sāṁkhya and Vedānta elements in PS, see the Introduction.

[3] R. quotes the *jagatī* verse, ṚS 6.47.18c (misassigned, however), in support: *índro māyā́bhiḥ pururū́pa īyate*, "Through his feats of magic, Indra goes in many forms." (Cf. BU 2.5.19.)

[4] On the epithet "present in the heart" (*guhāgata*) as a qualification of the Self, the Soul, or God, see, e.g., Śaṁkara, BSBh 1.2.11, where we find several of the passages from *Upaniṣads* also quoted in an extremely interesting article by Kuiper (1964, pp. 124 ff.), who writes (pp. 125-6): "It would require a special study to demonstrate the parallelism which for the Vedic poets exists between the macrocosmic opening of the primordial hill and the microcosmic opening of the mind, as the result of Indra's *vṛtrahátya-*. I must confine myself to the statement that the Rigvedic seer gets his vision with or in his heart (*hṛdā́* or *hṛdí*). This heart is equated to the cosmic mountain and its subterranean ocean... If it may be assumed that *guhāyām* in the Upaniṣads is a substitute of the later language for such Rigvedic terms as *vrajé, ūrvé, áśman*, which all denote the nether world viewed as an enclosure, the parallelism between the revelation of the 'sun in the rock' and the Upaniṣadic vision of the *ātman* 'placed in the cavity' is apparent." From Buddhist scripture, a similar passage is known: in *Dhammapada* 37 (also quoted in Asaṅga's

Mahāyānasaṁgraha 2.12), the Spirit is said to reside "in the cavity," viz., of the heart (*guhāśaya*). (See also n. 274 below.)

[5] Compare the name of *Ādhāra* ("support"), and the epithet *Jagadādhāra* ("support of the worlds"), given the teacher (*guru*, called Lord, *bhagavat*), Ananta- or Nāga- or Ādi-Śeṣa, i.e., the author of this book, in verses 8 and 87, resp. (Also see n. 25.)

[6] R. explains this "mirage" (*mṛgatṛṣṇikā*) as identical to *Prakṛti*, "the power to obscure the innate form of Viṣṇu, and to manifest another form, which power is *māyā*, here called *prakṛti*." See PS 22 on the mirage.

[7] R. glosses *saṁbhava* ("origination") by *prāpti* ("obtainment").

[8] This translation by a preterite of a Sanskrit perfect tense which, as a perfective, might denote the present (as in Russian), is corroborated by PS 8.

[9] R. quotes MuU 1.2.12: "With folded hands let him approach only a teacher, so as to learn that [peace], a learned man who has his stand in *Brahman*;" and BhG 4.34: "Those who know, have vision of the truth, will teach it."

[10] Viz., *Ṛg-*, *Yajur-*, *Sāma-*, and *Atharva-Veda*, containing visionary poetry, ritual prescriptions, ritual songs, and magic rules, respectively.

[11] Viz., Phonetics (*śikṣā*), Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), Etymology (*nirukta*), Metrics (*chandas*), Astronomy (*jyotiṣa*), and Ceremonial (*kalpa*), which are all used to determine the correct maintenance and application of Vedic poetry and prose.

[12] R. interprets "truth" as "the complete meaning of *Vedānta* [i.e., of the *Upaniṣads*], formed by the words of the Lord, Brahmā, etc." (Cf. n. 276.)

[13] According to R., "this" refers to the qualifications given in verse 3 as "the womb's abode, etc."

[14] R. explains "long" as follows: "This means 'without beginning': for, were transmigration to have a beginning, those who are released would be bound again, which is an absurd conclusion." Cf. Śaṁkara, BSBh 2.1.36: "[The beginningless-ness of the world] recommends itself to reason, and is seen [from Scripture]."

[15] R.: "In the triad of worlds (*lokatraye*)," viz., heaven, earth, and intermediate plane (while the underworld is mostly considered to belong to the earth; if not, it is substituted for the intermediate plane).

[16] I.e., through the series of births and deaths.

[17] R. explains: "Firstly, it is not the *Puruṣa* who transmigrates,

because he is all-pervasive and unstained, and through his passing from one world to another cannot engender a connection with acts and their results. Nor does *Prakṛti* transmigrate, because she can still less have such a connection, as she is unspiritual. The *Puruṣa*, deluded by *Prakṛti*, transmigrates under the name of 'individual soul' (*jīva*)."

[18] The word "net" (*jāla*) is often used in the sense of a (feat of) magic by Indian authors, as we may see, e.g., from the title of the Buddhist *Brahmajālasutta*, or "Discourse on the Net of Brahmā," which is placed at the head of the *Dīghanikāya* of the Pāli *Suttapiṭaka* (cf. on it, e.g., Renou and Filliozat, 1953, p. 335); in the latter, the word is also used to compare *saṁsāra* to a fisherman's net, in which all living beings are caught. Regarding its use in PS, see also PS 30 with n. 115, and PS 70 (which has a more metaphysical turn) with n. 233.

[19] The Qualities of Primordial Matter are *Sattva* (Goodness), *Rajas* (Passion), and *Tamas* (Darkness). Cf. Introduction.

[20] R. explains: "The Qualities envelop the *Puruṣa* just as its threads envelop a chrysalis, and their totality is the 'net,' like the chrysalis' cocoon. The acts which man performs are like the threads which the chrysalis produces [gradually out of its own body], some pure, others impure." R. quotes in support of this view the final *pāda* of a Rigvedic verse (misassigned by him again), which in its entirety runs as follows: "Having eyes, faces, arms, and feet everywhere, he kindles with two arms, with wings, the one god he, producing heaven and earth." (ṚS 10.81.3.) Cf. n. 18, above.

[21] Translation according to commentary (p. 11, l. 1), which identifies *moha* with *avidyā* ("ignorance"). Cf. below, PS 29, 55. Note that the words *mokṣa* and *moha* form a rhyming pair.

[22] Cf. PS 21, and n. 73. Also see Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 340, 344, 371-2, and particularly 405: "Denn nach Sāṁkhya-Lehre gehören Verdienst und Schuld nicht der ewigen und unveränderlichen Seele an, sondern sie sind Zustände (*bhāvāḥ*) des psychischen Organismus, nämlich des Erkennens (*buddhiḥ*)."

[23] R.: "Through knowledge, the soul (*puṁs, i.e., puruṣa*) attains *mokṣa* = *kaivalya* ("separation")." Cf. PS 70, 81, 83.

[24] Translated as suggested by R.: PS 7cd rules 5 through 7ab, inasmuch as the latter put some "practical" questions; hence the exhortation of 7cd ("Explain to me!") is no "theoretical" problem but refers to the intended deliverance from bondage.

[25] The Master's name means "the support," viz., of the worlds, explained by R. as Ananta. The latter means Ananta-Śeṣa, the serpent of the subterranean waters, and the support of Viṣṇu during the embryonic "sleep" of the cosmos; under this latter aspect, he is identified with Viṣṇu. (Cf. Kuiper, 1962, p. 144; and n. 277 ad PS 87.)

[26] *Upendra* literally means "younger brother of Indra" or "helper of Indra." This epithet of Viṣṇu refers to the aid he granted Indra in the latter's cosmogonic act by making three strides. As Kuiper (1962, p. 149) has written: "His first step corresponds to the nether world (which includes the earth), his second step to the upper world, but his third step is a mystery, not perceptible to the human eye, for it corresponds to the totality of the opposed moieties... All that exists is in the three steps, or in the third one that represents them." Viṣṇu's help for Indra is solicited by the latter as follows: "Friend Viṣṇu, stride out as far as possible." (ṚS 4.18.11d.) Thus, although Viṣṇu, as an Āditya, is older than Indra, who is "the youngest of the gods," he may be said to be Indra's "younger brother," or "second," i.e., the *Upendra*, both because he seconds Indra, and because he is the cosmic totality, which, although preceding the cosmogony, also follows upon the disintegration of the cosmic moieties (i.e., upon cosmogony itself), as it forms their reintegration. It is impossible, for reasons of space, to delve into this fascinating matter any further here; but the interested reader should not fail to consult the many articles which Kuiper has written about it and which are listed in the Bibliography.

[27] Cf. PS 22, 28, and 74.

[28] As was said in the Introduction, the Sāṁkhya view on the world is that, since it has been derived from *Prakṛti*, and since *Prakṛti* is real, the world is just as real as the *Puruṣas* are.

[29] I.e., *Prakṛti*, or Primordial Matter. (Cf. PS 1.) See Frauwallner, 1953, p. 352.

[30] See Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 358-9.

[31] See *ib.*, p. 359.

[32] R. quotes TU 2.1.1: "From that very Self space (or: ether) has sprung" (*tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ saṁbhūtaḥ*).

[33] Cf. Introduction, and n. 185.

[34] This refers to the reabsorption of the universe at the end of times, when the evolved world is reintegrated into the primordial world in an order which is the reverse of the one in which it was created. See BS 2.3.14, as well as PS 81.

[35] According to Sāṁkhya, there are two groups of organs (*karaṇa*), viz., external (*bāhya-*) and internal (*antaḥ-*) ones. The external organs comprise five "action faculties" (*karmendriya*), which are speech, hands, feet, anus, and the membrum virile; and five "sense faculties" (*buddhīndriya*), which are the ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose. The internal organs are: mind (*manas*), ego consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*), and cognition (*buddhi*). (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 312, 348 ff., 369 f.) In PS 14, 17-19, however, only one internal organ is assumed, most likely under Yoga influence. R. explains "the assembly of qualities and organs" as "the assembly of the former's effects, viz., the body, and the organs," to account for the next line, in which the "embodied soul" is called "the ruler of that assembly."

[36] R.: "Whether of pure, impure, or mixed [= partly pure, partly impure] form."

[37] R. identifies the embodied soul with the individual soul (*jīva*).

[38] R. interprets the soul as the assembly's support rather than its ruler. Although this might be possible from a semantic standpoint, it is very unlikely in view of the next verse, which says that the body should be ruled by the Spirit.

[39] Cf. PS 37.

[40] Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, p. 350. This verse raises the question of whether its author follows the Sāṁkhya doctrine according to which there are many souls, or the Vedānta doctrine according to which there is only one soul, viz., the *ātman*. Because it uses the word *dehin* in the singular, it might be thought of as belonging to the Vedānta tradition, but it may just as well speak of "one soul" with reference to the specific body it rules, leaving the question open as to the number of souls there might exist.

[41] Cf. Śaṁkara, BSBh 2.2.2, 7; Frauwallner, 1953, p. 377.

[42] This means the assembly of the body and the organs. (Cf. n. 35.)

[43] R. identifies *cit* with *cetana* (spirit), i.e., the "spiritual embodied soul" of PS 11. (Cf. PS. 60-61.) He explains: "The assembly of the effects [i.e., the body] and the organs moves, if the body is ruled by the Spirit, i.e., if it is appropriated by the [actually independent] Spirit in such a way [that the latter thinks]: 'I am a man, etc.'" Regarding that, cf., e.g., Śaṁkara, US, *Padyaprabandha*, 18.65cd: "Similarly, by imputing spirit[-uality on the organ of cognition], the principle of knowledge is predicated on the organ of cognition (*buddhi*) in this case."

[44] On the adversative function of the Sanskrit particle *ca*, see Speijer, 1886, section 441; Renou, 1968, section 382A.

[45] On this, R. quotes BhG 5.13cd-14ab: "As the embodied [soul] in the city with nine gates [= the body], neither acting nor causing to act, the Sovereign Lord (*prabhu*) emits neither the agency nor the acts of the world." The number nine for the gates of the body is a bit of mystery in a Hindu work, as Hindu authors usually assume the existence of an "eightfold one in the city of the body" (see below, n. 53). However, in Buddhist literature, the "nine gates of the body" form a common *topos*, as may be seen from *Vimānavatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, Pāli Text Society ed., p. 76, or from *Suttanipāta-Aṭṭhakathā*, id., p. 248, where they are said to comprise the two ears, two eyes, two nostrils, mouth, anus, and penis.

[46] On the subject of the number of internal organs, see n. 35. The assumption of a single such organ is probably due to Yoga influence, as Sāṁkhya psychology was generally transformed under the influence of the Yoga system taught by Vyāsa. Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 411, 418, and particularly 401: "Eine der umstrittensten Lehren in der klassischen Zeit des Sāṁkhya-Systems war... die Lehre von der Dreiheit der Innenorgane, Denken (*manaḥ*), Ichbewusstsein (*ahaṁkāraḥ*) und Erkennen (*buddhiḥ*). Vindhyavāsī scheute sich nicht, diese Dreiheit aufzugeben."

[47] On Ego Consciousness, see Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 309 ff., 318, 353-4, 369, 394-5, 402.

[48] Translation in accordance with R., who interprets *mūḍha* ("deluded") by *acetana* ("unspiritual").

[49] Translated in accordance with R.'s gloss.

[50] R.: "Among the effects of Magic," i.e., in the phenomenal world.

[51] The correct interpretation of this clause is obtained if *puruṣa* is connected not only with *abhimāna*, but also with *sukhaduḥkhabhāvanā*, because *sukha* and *duḥkha* are the characteristics of the Inner Organ.

[52] As interpreted by R.

[53] R. explains: Despite the pervasiveness and purity of the Self, the Inner Organ "superimposes all that [i.e., activity, etc.] on the Self by imputing to it an identity with the 'eightfold one in the city [of the body],' " i.e., with the aggregate of the five breaths (which are breathing forth, breathing away, breathing together, breathing upward, and breathing through), of mind (*manas*), plenitude (*pūr*), and speech (*vāc*). Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 60, 310, 366; PS 62.

[54] R. explains (p. 19, 1. 1): "Though all-pervasive, the [Self] goes from one body to another, and from one world to another, under the influence of *Upādhis*," i.e., of things which are near and determine it externally. *Upādhi* generally means "external determining factor;" see Vetter, 1972, p. 52, ad *Saṁkṣepa-Śārīraka* 1.115. However, in PS 74, the meaning "(external) condition" may be more appropriate, as in logic. (Cf. on this, Stcherbatsky, 1930, p. 122, n. 3; p. 124, n. 2; p. 127, n. 1-2; etc.) Futhermore, we may quote the passage from the Mahāyāna Buddhist *Ratnagotravibhāga* dealing with the same theme in a strikingly similar fashion, viz., 13.52, which says of the Buddhas' "Body of Enjoyment" (*sāṁbhogikakāya*): "Just as a gem, being dyed with various colours, does not make manifest its real essence, similarly, the [All-Pervasive] Lord (*vibhu*) never shows its real nature [i.e., of the Body of Enjoyment], though it appears in various forms, according to the conditions of the living beings." (See Takasaki, 1966, pp. 328-9.) Compare to this the statement by Śaṁkara in US, *Padyaprabandha*, 18.122.

It should be noted that the above RGV passage implies that the Buddha's *Saṁbhogakāya* has a real nature, albeit a concealed one, and thus has its place within a substantialist ontology of Buddhist philosophy. This fact may perhaps furnish us with some evidence for a theory according to which the PS should have among its direct predecessors in the history of Indian philosophy the Buddhist RGV, which was probably written by Asaṅga (under Maitreyan influence) around the middle of the fourth century A.D. (As to the date of RGV, see Ruegg, 1969, p. 55; whereas Frauwallner, 1969, pp. 255 f., assumes that Sāramati was its author, who "lived not long after Nāgārjuna," i.e., around the middle of the third century A.D.)

[55] I.e., something which is close to the Self and consequently determines it from the outside, i.e., the body together with its organs. (Cf. preceding note.) The translation is in accordance with R.

[56] Whereas the text of the PS speaks of "an *upādhi* created by the *guṇas*," which themselves belong to *prakṛti*, R. interprets this to mean that such an *upādhi* has been "made manifest by *prakṛti*." The interest of this gloss lies in the fact that R. apparently envisages a manifestation model of evolution on Sāṁkhya lines. (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 308, 352, and n. 195, p. 482, with a quotation of YD, p. 67, 11. 14-16.)

[57] R.: "Reflected in the Inner Organ."

[58] Cf. n. 46 above.

[59] From this, it becomes clear that it is only the reflection of the Self in the Inner Organ which moves, rather than the Self.

[60] The demon causing sun or moon eclipses. (Cf. also, e.g., on this phenomenon in myths: Lévi-Strauss, 1964, pp. 304-5; 1967, pp. 355-7; 1968, p. 273; 1971, p. 274.)

[61] Like Rāhu's, the Self's becoming visible is indirect and incomplete; hence the exhortation in the next verse. (Cf. n. 167 below.)

[62] Cf. n. 35 above.

[63] Or: "incomparable."

[64] On *advaita* ("without multiplicity"), see Vetter, 1978, pp. 112 ff.

[65] Translation in accordance with the verse's word order. However, R. connects *cetasā* ("by the mind") to *buddhigataṁ* ("present in the *Buddhi*") and *gamyam* ("must be understood") in such a manner that both the latter words would seem to be predicates of *Brahman*. This would lead to the following translation: "That *Brahman* [i.e., the own form of the Self] which is perceived—present in the *Buddhi* [and for that reason] to be understood by the mind [i.e., by the ego concept]—must be known as all-pervasive," etc. (The portions within square brackets are explanations given by R.) That translation is backed by neither word order nor the probable meaning of the verse. Indeed, there is no *obligation* on the part of the mind to understand *Brahman because* the latter is inside it; nor is there any particular need to stress the fact that the mind has a *capacity* to understand *Brahman because* of the same fact. The reason why R. contorted the word order may have been to show that *cetas* is identical with *buddhi* in the sense of the "Inner Organ." (Cf. notes 35, 46.)

[66] R. identifies *Buddhi* with the "Great Entity" (*mahat tattvam*) of Sāṁkhya. See Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 353, 402; n. 68 below.

[67] According to R., *Manas* is *the* Inner Organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), although the verse text of PS clearly mentions three such Inner Organs. Consequently, R. has reinterpreted his text in order to have it suit later Yoga doctrine. (See next note; also cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 369, 394, 401.) He may also have wanted to bring it into line with PS 14, 17-19.

[68] R. identifies this with the "Ego Entity" (*ahaṁ-tattvam*), on which cf. Frauwallner, 1953, p. 401. According to Vindhyavāsin, whose thought evinces Yoga influence, there is only one psychic organ, viz., *Manas*, while *Buddhi* (= *Mahat Tattvam*, "Great Entity" = *Mahān Ātmā*, "Great Self") is "die erste allgemeine, im einzelnen noch unbestimmte Form, in der die Urmaterie in Erscheinung tritt, oder wie es nach alter

Ausdrucksweise heisst, sich entfaltet (*vyaktiḥ*). Sie ist blosses Sein (*sattāmātram*), während die Urmaterie weder seiend noch nichtseiend (*niḥsadasat*) ist, und sie ist blosses Merkmal (*liṅgamātram*), während die Urmaterie noch merkmallos (*aliṅgam*) ist." (See Frauwallner, 1953, p. 402.) The Ego Consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*), on the other hand, "ist das Prinzip der Individuation. Es zählt aber noch nicht zum psychischen Organismus. Psychisches Organ ist erst das Denken (*manaḥ*)." (*Ib.*)

[69] These are: Pure Entity of Sound (*śabda-tanmātra*), of Touch (*sparśa-t.*), of Form (or: Colour, *rūpa-t.*), of Flavour (*rasa-t.*), and of Smell (*gandha-t.*). (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 340, 345-8, 355 ff., 402, 404.)

[70] Those are the "Five Sense Faculties of Cognition" (*buddhīndriya*), and the "Five Sense Faculties of Action" (*karmendriya*), referred to in n. 35, above. (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 290, 293-4, 299, 311, 354-5, 369, 391 ff., 403-4.)

[71] Those are: Space (or Ether, *ākāśa*; or, as R. puts it, *vyoman*), Wind (*vāyu*), Heat (*tejas*), Water (*ap*), and Earth (*pṛthivī* or *bhūmi*). (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 289-90, 293, 310-1, 355 ff., 404, 407.)

[72] R.: "They are 'derived from *Prakṛti*' insofar as they are derived from the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) through the Great Entity, etc." (Cf. notes 1, 66, 68; Frauwallner, 1953, p. 352.) R. also refers to PS 10.

[73] R.: "Merit (*dharma*) and Demerit (*adharma*) are impressions (*saṁskāra*, literally: conformations) of pure and impure acts (*karman*)." Cf. PS 7; also see n. 22.

[74] R.: "Just as the fact of being red, etc. [of a nearby object (*upādhi*) does not really exist in] a crystal." Cf. PS 16.

[75] R. says: "If a consideration of reality (*vastu*) is made." He thereby seems to explain the word *paramārthe*, so as to have it mean, "according to the highest truth." However, since *paramārthe* directly follows on *iha* ("in this;" R.: = *ātmani*, "in the Self"), and since a translation by "according to the highest truth" would rather suggest Sanskrit *paramārthataḥ*, the translation as given here seems preferable to the one probably envisaged by R. Moreover, our own is also suggested by R.'s reference to the analogy between Merit, etc., as existing in the Self's reflected image in the Inner Organ, and redness, etc., as existing in the nearby red object's reflected image in the crystal.

[76] Because of the importance of this verse, with its implied illusionism, I propose to the reader that he should carefully read the following, rather long, commentary by R., which I have translated

somewhat freely in order to make it better understood by the Westerner. The fact should not be overlooked, however, that at least part of the "explanation" or, rather, interpretation given by R. would have been unthinkable without the use of later Vedāntist doctrines about epistemology and ontology, which he had ready before his mind's eye. While this statement is also applicable to the large majority of his "explanations," which are nonetheless quite illuminating, both in respect of the PS and of his own way of thinking, it was thought advisable here to quote him somewhat more fully than elsewhere for two reasons: firstly, because this verse holds some "illusionistic" implications which are more obvious than in most other verses of the PS, without raising, however, the hope of attributing it to any doctrine of later ages; and, secondly, because it is interesting to see how R. uses *Upaniṣad* quotations in support of his arguments. He says:

" 'The entire appearance of [the Self as] the world is erroneous,' because it is superimposed (*adhyasta*) on the Self, due to Ignorance (*avidyā*) about it. Its falsity follows from its being undefinable by either being or not-being; for it can neither be confirmed in accordance with reality, nor is there any direct experience of its unreality; and reality and unreality both do not apply to it.

"Various analogies are adopted in order to understand the non-establishment of the experience of a false object. And, likewise, a word denoting something logically impossible (*vivādapada*) forms the application, because it is seen wrongly, is different, and is devoid of essence: e.g., water in a mirage.

"What, then, is 'falsity' (*mithyātva*)? We find: 'Being contradicted by knowledge about the reality of a substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*).' Would this inference also confirm its own falsity, or would it not? If not, there would be the fallacy of visibility, etc., in itself alone; if it would, it would destroy itself. This much is true: like Scripture, that would only destroy the Self: Scripture, too, disproves the Self as well—in that the Self is inside multiplicity—, by disproving everything multiple (*dvaita*) in *Brahman*, through the words: 'There is nothing diverse here' (BU 4.4.19). So it must be admitted that this inference has the shape of the argument in favour of the foregoing.

"If it is held against this that nowhere in the world self-destruction is observable, fuel in a consuming fire should be pointed to, since there self-destruction is observable. In just the same way, if one says, 'How

should a false object not make known reality?', we ask, 'Which teacher, indeed, calls a false entity unindicative of substantial reality?' For our view is that only the Self is reality, and that he is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*).

" 'How should Scriptures, which are false, make reality known?' What, then, is the use of them here? Thus, they only remove Ignorance, which is naturally false. But, even though they are false, such removal is like the [effect of the] lion one sees in his dream: as the lion seen in the dream, though false, removes the false dream projection (*svāpna-prapañca*), together with its causes, so Scriptures, etc., though false, remove the false world of multiplicity perceived when we are awake.

"In addition, there is more obvious proof for the fact that a false object does indicate truth. The reflection of a face in a mirror suggests the position of the real face, and a girl seen in a dream makes apparent the gaining of happiness; as those who know about dream lore say: 'When one sees in his dreams a woman during the *Kāmyeṣṭi* rites, he will know prosperity in these.' (ChU 5.2.9.) [On those rites, cf. Caland, 1908; they are carried out for the fulfillment of some desire, and if one sees, in the course of the time which they take up, a woman in one's dream, she serves as a good portent.] Likewise, if one sees, e.g., Viṣṇu during one's enraptured state, that is also understood by all men as instrumental to the vision of the truth, although it is false. Therefore, there is not any mistake at all in concluding to the falsity of [the world's] discursive development (*prapañca*). In the opposite case, we should be hampered by the inadmissible conclusion that there can be no deliverance, because bondage would be real."

The remainder of R.'s commentary on verse 22 is not quite so interesting, except perhaps where he quotes a passage of four words ("He who is invisible can, indeed, not be seen") which may be an approximation (due, if it is true, no doubt to the fact that Indians mostly quote from memory and, consequently, without attribution) of the famous statement about the *ātman* in BU 3.9.26: "He is not thus, not thus; the Self, who is not apprehensible, cannot, indeed, be apprehended." This statement may have been in R.'s mind because it serves to bring out the truth that Sacred Scripture, precisely because it refrains from an attempt at giving a definition of ultimate reality (embodied in the *ātman* or *brahman* concept), is able to indicate the truth by approximation. We shall return to this theme in discussing R.'s explanation of PS 80. (See n. 260 below.)

[77] On the analogy of water in a mirage, see Śaṁkara, US, *Gadyaprabandha*, 109.

[78] On the analogies of silver in mother-of-pearl, and of a snake in a rope, see *ib.*, 55. On that of a snake, or a rivulet, in a rope, see also GK 2.17. (Furthermore, cf. Hacker, 1953, p. 10.)

[79] A disorder of the eyes causing double vision. It is often employed as an analogon to metaphysical ignorance by Vedānta authors; see, e.g., Sarvajñātman, *Saṁkṣepa-Śārīraka*, 1.318 (translated in Vetter, 1972, p. 104, with note).

[80] R. quotes ŚvU 6.11: "The one god [= the Self], hidden in all beings, all-pervasive, the Self within all beings."

[81] R.: "In the assemblies of effects [= bodies] and organs." Cf. notes 35, 43.

[82] Translation in agreement with R.

[83] On the identification of *piṇḍa* ("lump") as "body" (*deha*), cf. PS 27, 61, and n. 262 *ad* PS 81.

[84] R. quotes BU 4.5.13: "So, truly, this entire Self, which is only a totality of knowledge (*prajñā*), is neither inside nor outside." Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, p. 459, n. 37; Vetter, 1978, pp. 113, 118.

[85] Cf. GK 3.5-6; and Vetter, 1978, p. 118.

[86] Maybe the use of the term *buddha* is due to Buddhist influence. Cf. GK 4.98: "Devoid of obstacles, all factors-of-existence (*dharma*) are spotless by nature, in [and since] the beginning waked (or: illuminated, *buddha*), also released (*mukta*); thus know the Guides [i.e., the Buddhas, to whom reference is made in GK 4.99-100]." (See Vetter, 1978, p. 98.)

[87] Cf. GK 4.10: "All factors-of-existence are by their own nature free from old age and death; those who believe in old age and death are destroyed on account of that belief." (See Vetter, 1978, p. 101.)

[88] R. quotes MuU 2.2.11 (not 10, as the AGM text edition reads): "Everything shines in accordance with that shining [*Brahman*] alone." Śaṁkara glosses "that" by "*Brahman*;" however, in the context of PS 25 we might as well put in "*Ātman*."

[89] R.: "I.e., separate from the body, which is unspiritual because of its visibility, like a jar, etc."

[90] *Kha*, i.e., *ākāśa*. R. quotes BU 2.4.14: "Truly, my Lady, it is [only] this [body] which suffices to know. For, where there is, as it were, a double entity (*dvaita*) [i.e., a "lump of body and cognition," to which other "lumps of body and cognition" are opposed], there the one [Self]

sees the other [Self]... However, where the totality of this [man, i.e., the "Self that is a lump of body and cognition"] has become the only Self: with which [organ] should he [i.e., the individual Self dissolved into the "Great Self"] see whom [i.e., which Self opposed to his Self = himself]?" (Translated in agreement with P. Thieme, *Upanischaden*, Stuttgart, 1966, p. 76, as quoted by Vetter, 1978, pp. 117-8.)

R. further quotes ChU 6.8.7: "Thou art that [*ātman*]" (*tat tvam asi*). That "thou" (*tvam*) is subject, and "that" (*tat*) predicate, is pointed out by, among others, Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, 3.25. (Cf. Hacker, 1950, p. 75.)

R. finally quotes BU 1.4.10: "I am *Brahman*."

[91] This translation of Sanskrit *eva* by "[one and] same" is suggested by R., and indeed quite plausible.

[92] *Idem.*

[93] R. quotes ChU 6.1.4: "Just as, my dear [Śvetaketu], through one lump of clay all that is made of clay should be known: the modification (*vikāra*) [i.e., the "effect"], which is a [mere] name, and which has its "origin" in speech (*vācārambhaṇa*), is [actually only] clay; this alone is the truth." Both Sāṁkhya and Vedānta have derived much of their ontology, and, consequently, of their soteriology, from statements like this one, teaching an early *Satkāryavāda*, i.e., the doctrine according to which an effect (*kārya*) is true (*sat*) only insofar as it is identical with its cause (*kāraṇa*). (Cf. Śaṁkara, BSBh 2.1.14; and the Introduction, above.)

[94] The addition within square brackets is on the authority of R.

[95] R. quotes BU 3.9.28.7: "Brahman is knowledge (*vijñāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*)."

[96] R. quotes BU 3.7.3: "He who, staying inside the earth, is different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who controls the earth whilst inside, he is thy Self, the Inner Controller, who is immortal." See also MāU 1.6, and BS 1.2.18-20.

[97] R. construes *antaryāmin* and *prāṇa* into a (dualistic) pair of cosmic-psychic principles, so that the former becomes the "immortal Self," and the latter the principle of individuation, viz., the "soul nature of that [Self], reflected in the inert [*Prakṛti*], which has its own Magic (*māyā*) for its power (*śakti*)," etc. These are, then, to be the two distinct states of knowledge (*vijñāna*), compared to the "two birds, who are companions, on a branch," of ŚvU 4.6. The image here employed is very ancient. It is found already in ṚS 1.164.20, where the two birds are sitting on either

side of the World Tree (which is the equivalent of the Primeval Hill, or Cosmic Mountain), one bird eating "the sweet berry," which is apparently identical with "the share of [the beverage of] life" (*amṛ́tasya bhāgám*), as well as with the *mádhu* mentioned in the next stanzas; while the other bird looks on without eating. (Cf. ṚS 10.85.18-19; on this important subject, see the pioneering study by Kuiper, 1970, pp. 126-7, and Eliade, 1964, p. 480, n. 68.)

Finally, note that, while here mention is made of only one Breath (*prāṇa*), there are five such Breaths in the expression "the Eightfold One in the City" quoted by R. *ad* PS 15 (see n. 53 above), and seven in MuU 2.1.8a.

[98] R.: "I.e., the Brahmā Egg, stretching for 500 million *Yojanas*." A *Yojana* is a stage at either 4.5 or 9 statute miles. (Cf. PS 10.)

[99] See n. 83.

[100] R.: "The species of gods, men, walking animals, birds, creeping animals, and the flora (*sthāvara*, literally: "what is fixed")."

[101] According to Bhartṛprapañca (quoted by Hiriyanna, 1924/1957, pp. 82 ff.), there are eight states (*avasthā*, as they are also called in PS 27) of *Brahman*, viz., (1) *antaryāmin*; (2) *sākṣin* ("witness"); (3) *avyākṛta* ("undeveloped"); (4) *sūtra* ("strand," hence also: "rule"); (5) *virāj*; (6) *devatā* ("godhead"); (7) *jāti* ("species, genus"); (8) *piṇḍa*.

[102] Which is really only one; R. quotes ChU 6.2.1: "Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second." The problem here, which R. clearly perceives (as indeed do all Vedāntists), is that, if the distinctions imputed to the Self are unreal, the Vedic injunctions toward sacrificial rites, connecting a specific rite to a specific effect, would be useless in the ultimate effect. (Cf. Śaṁkara, BSBh 2.1.14.) R. touches on this problem only very briefly, with the words: "No one enjoys a bath in the water of a mirage." That is a way of abbreviating the argument put by Śaṁkara (*l.c.*) in the following terms:

"But, how can the Vedānta [= *Upaniṣad*] texts, if [ultimately] untrue, convey information about the true being of *Brahman*? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a snake [falsely imagined] in a rope dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing.—This objection, we reply, is without force, [because, as a matter of fact, we do see real effects to result from unreal causes], for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom [when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake], and

effects [of what is perceived in a dream], such as the bite of a snake, or bathing in a river, take place with regard to a dreaming person." Śaṁkara concludes his argument in favour of what we might call a "pious fraud" by pointing to the devotional use of regarding *Brahman* as finite and subject to causation: "The view of *Brahman* as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations (*upāsana*) on the qualified (*saguṇa*) *Brahman*." (My translation closely follows that of Thibaut, 1904, Vol. I; also cp. BSBh 1.2.14.) Cf. n. 76 above.

[103] Cf. PS 22, and preceding note. R. again refers to "the errors of water in a mirage, and silver in mother-of-pearl."

[104] R. briefly recapitulates the argument set out in n. 76.

[105] Cf. Vetter, 1978, pp. 112-30 ("Zur Bedeutung von (A)Dvaita").

[106] R. interprets this in a sense which is obviously due to influence from later Advaita-Vedānta writers. According to him, "*Avidyā* has only arisen out of ignorance (*ajñāna*) about the Self (*ātman*) [being] without a second (*advitīya*); but, even so, it is also the efficient cause (*kartṛ*) of effects (*kārya*)," i.e., of the phenomenal world. On the epistemological and ontological meanings of words for "ignorance" in Vedānta philosophy, see the Introduction.

In his commentary on verse 29, R. identifies *Avidyā* with *Prakṛti* ("Primordial Matter"), *Māyā* ("Magic, Illusion"), *Pradhānam* ("That which is principal," i.e., *Prakṛti*), *Akṣaram* ("The Indestructible," another, but less common equivalent of *Prakṛti*), and *Śūnyam* ("The Void"), respectively.

[107] On this term, see Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 326-7; Vetter, 1972, pp. 104-5 (*ad* 1.318).

[108] R.: "Viz., the body, etc."

[109] R.: "Secondarily [though not really] characterized (*upalakṣita*) by [this] 'error,' and for this reason alone 'deluded,' i.e., devoid of a desire to know the truth about [their] Self."

[110] On the identity between Vāsudeva and Viṣṇu, see Gonda, 1960, pp. 243-4, 237; Held, 1935, p. 165. (Cf. n. 227 below.)

[111] R. adds a short gloss on *avidyā* (perhaps meant to explain *bhrānti*, "error," which does occur in this verse), regarding which see n. 106.

[112] Himself = his Self (*ātman*): Sanskrit *ātman* doubles as a substantive noun ("the Self"), and a reflexive pronoun ("himself").

[113] Cf. GK 2.19-28, on which see Vetter, 1978, p. 124.

[114] R. here identifies *prāṇa* and *antaryāmin* with each other, in contrast to his gloss on PS 27. (Cf. n. 97.)

[115] *Jāla* ("net"), i.e., *māyā*. (Cf. n. 18.)

[116] R.: "By his power (*śakti*) of autonomy, i.e., *māyā*."

[117] R. refers to BS 2.1.33: "But [*Brahman's* creative activity] is mere play, such as we see in ordinary life (*loka*, literally: "the world")."

[118] *Turya* = *turīya*, which R. explains as "the natural (*nija*) place of the Lord." See MāU 1.12 on the "Fourth State" (*caturtha*) of the Self (*ātman*) = *Brahman* = the sacred syllable "*Om*" (*praṇava*), which is said to have four "feet," i.e., one which exceeds, and transcends, the three "morae" or "phonemes" (*mātrā*, viz., *A, U, M*) of which it is traditionally supposed to consist, together with these three. GK 1.10 calls the "Fourth State" *turya*, as does PS 31, and identifies it with "the Lord" (*īśāna*), as does R. (probably influenced by GK 1.10). Cp. GK 1.18: "Let one know the *praṇava* as the Lord (*īśvara*) of everything, who stays in the heart."

[119] "Alike" attempts to translate *eva*.

[120] For a "First State" to be characterized by being awake must be due to influence from MāU 1.3, for such is the doctrine of the latter verse, while GK 1.14a lets it be characterized by dream sleep as much as is the Second State.

[121] For the "Second State" to be characterized by dream sleep is due to both MāU 1.4 and GK 1.14.

[122] Deep sleep as characteristic of the "Third State" is due to MāU 1.5, to which GK 1.14 forms an approximation by calling it (under the name of *Prājña*) "connected with dreamless sleep."

[123] According to GK 1.13, even *Prājña*, the Third State, which is characterized by deep sleep (cf. MāU 1.5, 11), is still "joined to embryonic sleep (*bīja-nidrā*)." (Cf. Vetter, 1972, p. 105, *ad* 1.318, on *bīja* in 2.127 as a synonym of *avidyā*.) Consequently, GK 1.15 points to the difference between the three former states, characterized by dream sleep and dreamless sleep, and the Fourth State, characterized by neither: "Dream sleep is [the state] of him who perceives wrongly; dreamless sleep, of him who does not know the truth; if the error of those two is destroyed, one reaches the Fourth State (*turīyaṁ padam*)."

[124] This in agreement with GK 1.27: "For the syllable '*Om*' is the beginning, middle, and also end of everything."

[125] I.e., "Every." This is due to GK 1.1 ff., whereas MāU 1.3 calls

the First State *Vaiśvānara*. It must be a quotation from Gauḍapada, because Ādiśeṣa could easily have used the common term *Vaiśvānara*, which goes back to the MāU, as no metrical obstacles would have presented themselves in that case. Gauḍapada, by contrast, was forced to use the term *Viśva metri causa*. It follows from this that, if Ādiśeṣa could have, but has not, used *Vaiśvānara* rather than *Viśva*, he has borrowed it from Gauḍapada, and furthermore, that he lived at a later date than Gauḍapada (as was pointed out in the Introduction).

[126] I.e., "Fiery." This is due to GK 1.1 ff., which form an explanation of MāU 1.4.

[127] I.e., "Knowing." This is due to GK 1.1 ff., which form an explanation of MāU 1.5.

[128] On this verse as a whole, see the Introduction, and Vetter, 1978, pp. 97, 127-8. R. synthesizes arguments from MāU/GK (on the four states of the *ātman*/*brahman*/*praṇava*), and BS (on the illusory nature of the manifestation of God/*brahman*), in order to answer the following question: "If the Lord is one, how can there be different states in him?" He says (p. 42): "The Fourth State (*turya*) is the proper condition (*avasthāna-samaya*) of the Self in the form of mere Being (*sat*), Bliss (*ānanda*), and Thought (*cit*), after it has discarded its own Ignorance (*avidyā*) through complete knowledge (*saṁvid*) of itself. This will also be the state of each individual Subject of Cognition (*pramātṛ*), since it has the form of Self-experience (*ātmānubhava*), and since it is intrinsic to all."

[129] R.: "The Lord (*bhagavat*), who is the Self (*ātman*), which is self-luminous thought (*svaprakāśa-cit*)."

[130] Cf. n. 112 above.

[131] *Māyā* means either Power of Magic, or that power's product. On the problems involved in these two meanings, see the Introduction, p. 6.

[132] Cf. n. 105.

[133] Two interpretations are possible: either, with R., "God (finally) perceives himself as the individual soul (*puruṣa*) = the Supreme Self (*paramātman*);" or, against R., "God fails to perceive himself as more than the individual soul, due to his own magic." The context makes the latter alternative the more plausible one.

[134] *Guhāgata*; see n. 4 above. Cf. KaṭhaU 1.14-19; TĀ 10.10.1; MNU 8.3; ŚvU 3.20; ChU 7.3.3; ṚS 1.24.12, 7.33.9, 10.129.4, 177.1; etc. On those texts, see Kuiper, 1964, pp. 124-5; 1970, *passim*; 1975, *passim*;

these articles have fundamentally changed our views on the key concepts of Indian religions.

[135] *Dvaita*; see n. 105.

[136] *Vyavahāra-stha*, literally: "staying in *vyavahāra*." R. takes *vyavahāra* as God's mode of existing in ordinary life, i.e., inside the phenomenal world, and therefore explains the compound *vyavahāra-stha* by: "being in the [mode of] existence of the individual soul (*jīvabhāvaṁ gataḥ*)." However, as this presents no clear contrast to the following *paramārthataḥ* ("according to supreme reality"), while the text obviously intends such a contrast by the intervening *na punaḥ*, another possible interpretation seems preferable, viz., "as God presents himself (according) to the usual conception [about him]." This interpretation is, moreover, bolstered by R.'s own explanation of *vyavahāra* in PS 55. (Cf. n. 179.)

[137] R. interprets those three conditions of the Inner Organ (called *manas*, "mind, thought"), viz., tranquility, joy, and delusion, as being based on its three *guṇa* aspects, which are *sāttvika, rājasa*, and *tāmasa*, respectively. These, in their turn, represent the three *guṇas* ("qualities") of *Prakṛti*, viz., *sattva, rajas*, and *tamas*, respectively. In classical Sāṁkhya, as formulated by Pañcaśikha, the *guṇas*, being qualities of *Prakṛti*, attach themselves to Ego Consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*), in order to bring about the evolution of the world. (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 311-2, 354; Dasgupta, 1922, pp. 249-50.) According to that doctrine, there is a threefold Inner Organ, consisting of *buddhi* ("cognition"), *ahaṁkāra*, and *manas*. (Cf. Frauwallner, pp. 366, 369, 401.) Consequently, if we read here about *manas* being able to affect the three states which are otherwise attributed to *ahaṁkāra*, the likely conclusion is that *manas* means the single Inner Organ, as taught by the Yogins and later Sāṁkhyas. (Cf. PS 14, 17-19; notes 35 and 46, above.)

The idea according to which God may, as it were, affect any of the three states due to the influence of the Qualities of Matter, may itself be due to influence from a text which held great authority in Yoga circles, viz., a portion of the so-called *Mokṣadharma* ("Doctrine of Release") in the MBh (12.194.31-36 = 247.20-25 = 287.29-31, 25b-28a, as found in the Calcutta edition of 1834-39, and quoted in Frauwallner, 1953, p. 291). It should be noted that here, as in PS 47, the soul (*puruṣa*) is called "field knower" (*kṣetra-jña*), and that to it are attributed the *guṇas* (through *manas*). The passage runs as follows: "Whatever is connected with pleasure in the body or the mind (*manas*), that must be designated as

the state of goodness (*sattva*). Whatever is connected with sorrow, and causes displeasure to the soul (*ātman*), that one must consider the effect of passion (*rajas*). Whatever is connected, finally, with dumbness, has no distinct object, is not thought and recognized clearly, that one must regard as darkness (*tamas*). Joy, satisfaction, bliss, pleasure, and peace of mind, whether they are accidental or derived from some cause, are the qualities (*guṇa*) of goodness. Dissatisfaction, pain, sorrow, greed, and impatience are to be observed as features of passion, whether they are founded or appear as baseless. Ignorance, delusion, rashness, sleep, and sloth, however they occur, are qualities of darkness." Some influence may have been exercised by Yogins conversant with these ideas upon the author of the PS, Ādiśeṣa, but possibly very indirectly, since the *Mokṣadharma* teaches a cognitive hierarchy in which *manas* is only the sixth element, preceded by five sense faculties and followed by *buddhi* and *kṣetrajña*.

138 R.: "Pleasure, sorrow, and delusion." (Cf. preceding note.)

139 Cf. GK 3.4-5: "Just as the spaces (*ākāśa*) [within] jars, etc., if the jars, etc., disintegrate, dissolve completely into space (*ākāśa*), similarly, the individual souls (*jīva*) [dissolve] into this Self (*ātman*). Just as [because there is actually only one space], if one space [within] a jar is filled with filth, smoke, etc., not all [spaces in all jars] are [so] filled, similarly, [if one individual soul is filled with joy, etc., not all] individual souls [are filled] with joy, etc. [because there is actually only one soul, viz., the *ātman*, to which the affects are purely accidental]." Also see PS 51; Śaṁkara, BSBh 2.2.24, on space = ether being a positive entity rather than mere absence of impediment; *ib.*, 2.1.22.

140 R.: "I.e., *Prakṛti*, transformed into that which has the nature of the assembly of effects [= body] and Inner Organ." (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 352-3.)

141 R. quotes two characteristics of the *ātman*, as taught by BU 4.3.7: "It meditates and plays, as it were." (Cf. PS 75, 82, as well as the next verses.)

142 Explanation in square brackets is in accordance with R.

143 *Idem.*

144 *Idem.*

145 R. quotes BhG 4.37: "Just as fire, [once it has been] kindled, reduces pieces of firewood to ashes, O Arjuna, so does the fire of knowledge reduce all acts to ashes."

[146] In accordance with R.

[147] Sanskrit *api nāma* probably denotes an emphatic "also" (i.e., *api*, strengthened by *nāma*), as the sentence cannot be a question. To translate the main clause by: "*How, really,* does that act *not* attach to its author?" would be clearly contrary to the intended sense. (Cf. Speijer, 1886, sections 396, and 412, Remark, on the strengthened interrogative particles.)

[148] R. quotes ChU 4.14.3: "As water does not attach to a lotus petal, so does an evil act not attach to someone who knows thus [viz., as the sacrificial fires had taught Satyakāma]." This *Upaniṣad* passage is also interpreted by Śaṁkara: BSBh 1.2.15. (Cf. PS 75.)

[149] Addition in accordance with R.

[150] I.e., of speech, body, and mind.

[151] R.: "[The erroneous belief according to which] one is an author [of an action]." That belief is responsible for the fact that acts not only have their visible effects, but also produce results later on.

[152] On the splendour of the Self, see, e.g., ChU 4.15.4: "He [i.e., the *Puruṣa* in the eye = the *Ātman*], forsooth, brings splendour, for he shines in all worlds; in all worlds shines he who knows thus." Possibly in reminiscence of this sentence, R. gives as the subject of "naturally splendid" in PS 42 the *Puruṣa* (*puṁs*).

[153] Translation against R. ("those acts go, i.e., dissolve, into *Brahman*") for two reasons: (1) no acts can *go* into *Brahman*, since that would stain *Brahman*; (2) word order (*brahmaṇi tattvajñānāt*) suggests that *brahmaṇi* qualifies *tattvajñānāt* (even though *yānti,* "they go," which must be supplied in either case, might be regarded as put in between).

[154] R. specifies the *Guṇas* as "physical bodies (*kāya*), [i.e.,] the [human] body (*deha*), etc."

[155] This verse may be related to Śaṁkara, US, *Padya*, 17.61: "Just as clarified butter, which, after one has drawn it from milk, is thrown back into the latter, is not in it as before, so the Spirit, [drawn] out of *Buddhi*, etc., the Embodied Soul, [drawn] out of what is untrue, will not be [in that] as before." (*kṣīrāt sarpir yathoddhṛtya kṣiptaṁ tasmin na pūrvavat / buddhyāder jñas tathā 'satyān na dehī pūrvavad bhavet //*)

[156] Cf. n. 107 above.

[157] R.: The Soul, "proceeding, though cut off from the body, etc., as if not being cut off from these." This refers to him who, though provided

with the knowledge that liberates from misery, still acts, due to the impressions of actions committed previously. (See PS 38-44.)

[158] R. quotes BU 4.5.13: "Just as an entire lump of salt is a mere totality of flavour without inside or outside, so, forsooth, is this entire Self a mere totality of knowledge without inside or outside." That is a more abstract rendering of Yājñavalkya's teaching to Maitreyī in BU 2.4.12: "As a lump of salt, cast into the water, so that one can no longer take it out of that water, yet, wherever one draws from the water, it is saline, so, forsooth, it is with this great, endless, boundless being which consists of pure knowledge." (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, p. 79; Vetter, 1978, pp. 113 ff.) Śaṁkara, too, quotes from these passages in US, *Gadya*, 43.

[159] R. explains this verse as follows: "The limbs of the body, viz., head, hands, feet, etc., are [in reality] only the body, they are not different from the latter; yet, the body is different from them, since, otherwise, it could not have [them as its] limbs. The modified products of clay, viz., jars, dishes, drums, etc., are only clay, they are not different from the latter; yet, clay is different from them, since, otherwise, it could not be [their] cause. In the same manner, the immobile and mobile world, which is not multiple—being only *Brahman*, which is of one flavour with Being, Bliss, and Thought—, appears as multiple, as different from *Brahman*; but that is only appearance, not due to reality. Even so, *Brahman* is different from the world, since, otherwise, it could not be its primordial cause (*mūla-kāraṇa*)."

This reflects influence from Śaṁkara's BSBh 2.1.9: *ananyatve 'pi kārya-kāraṇayoḥ kāryasya kāraṇātmatvaṁ na tu kāraṇasya kāryātmatvaṁ*: "Even though cause and effect are identical, the effect is the cause, but the cause is not the effect." (Quoted by Hacker, 1953, pp. 28-9.)

R. ends his explanation by quoting MNU 11.1: "The all, Nārāyaṇa [= Viṣṇu], God, the imperishable, the supreme place, superior to everything, permanent, all, Nārāyaṇa, Hari [= Viṣṇu]."

[160] Normally, the term "field knower" (*kṣetra-jña*) is given to *Puruṣa* in the *Mokṣadharma*. (See n. 137 above.) The *Puruṣas* of Sāṁkhya are, however, not one, but many. Hence, if PS 47a adopts a single "field knower," he may, in view of the context, well be identical with the one *Ātman*. Furthermore, if this assumption is correct, it would be another instance of contamination between Sāṁkhya and Vedānta ideas in the PS. The question is: which type of Vedānta?

If the many *Puruṣas*, or "field knowers," as they are called, are essentially identical with the one *Puruṣa*, i.e., *Ātman*, just as the many sparks of a fire are essentially one fire, that does not imply that the world is identical with the *Ātman*. So, once again, we may be faced with a verse which stands in some early tradition of *Viśiṣṭādvaita-* or *Bhedābhedādvaita-Vedānta*, i.e., that school of Vedānta which teaches that the world is identical with *Ātman/Brahman*, even though the *Ātman/Brahman* stays separate from the world.

This view is perhaps corroborated by the relative silence of R. on this verse. For he may have found it difficult to explain in a spirit which was more familiar to him, viz., later Advaita-Vedānta, if the PS actually belonged to an earlier school of thought. His discussion of it remains uncharacteristically flat, and he ends the gloss by saying: "The meaning of the sentence is [to bring out] the unity of the individual soul with the Supreme." This is undoubtedly true, but leaves out of sight the problems which the verse raises.

[161] R. explains them as the species already encountered in n. 100 above.

[162] R. quotes BU 2.1.20: "As sparks fly up from fire, so do those Selves from this Self." He misquotes it, however, as BU 2.1.20 really runs as follows: "Just as a spider may climb upward by means of a thread [which it has emanated from itself through no outside cause], and from a fire tiny sparks fly upward [which emanate from the fire itself through no outside cause, while clearly being themselves fire in nature], in exactly the same way, from this Self (*ātman*), all breaths (*prāṇa*), all worlds, all gods, all beings arise [which do not owe their existence to anything but the Self, and which are themselves the Self in nature]."

The explanations between square brackets are those given by Śaṁkara, who, in a long discussion of BU 2.1.20, adds some more illusionistic elements. They bring out a kind of Satkāryavāda modified by Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vedānta, which seems to be in some sort of an agreement with the intention of PS 47. It must be left to speculation whether R.'s quoting Mādhyaṁdina ŚB 14.5.1.23 is based on an optional interpretation, as in Śaṁkara: "All those Selves, with characteristics manifested through connection with *Upādhis*." (On Satkāryavāda, see n. 93; Hacker, 1953, p. 28.)

[163] Although *iva* ("as it were, like") occurs only once in the Sanskrit

verse text, it should be linked to both *baddhā* ("bound"), which precedes it, and *dhānya-jātayaḥ* ("specific grains"), which follows it, R. says. This is because bondage is only apparent, and the way people are bound by their ignorance resembles the way certain grains are by their husks.

164 R. explains that the fire of knowledge, which burns the seed of rebirth (i.e., the belief that our acts belong to ourselves, as we have seen in PS 42), resembles the fire burning the seeds of certain grains, so that the latter will not sprout again. (Also cf. PS 37; US, *Padya*, 17.26d.)

165 Cf. notes 19, 137.

166 R. glosses this epithet by "the viewer" (*draṣṭṛ*), viz., of the "object fields" (*kṣetra*). However, according to PS 15, it is wrong to think that the Self "is the one who views (*draṣṭṛ*) acts from the highest ones downward." Since there can be no essential difference between "fields" and "acts", because the former provide the material upon which the latter act, we must conclude to a certain inconsistency between PS and R. The latter supports his gloss by a reference to BhG 13.33: "As the one sun illuminates [i.e., makes visible] this whole world, so this field knower (*kṣetrin*) illuminates [i.e., makes visible] the whole object field (*kṣetra*), O Bhārata [= Arjuna]!" (The explanation of "illuminates" by "makes visible" rests on Śaṁkara's authority: *prakāśayati* = *avabhāsayati*.)

167 R., in an obvious reference to PS 18, explains: "But how does non-luminous Ignorance arise in the luminous Self, which is the Lord? By way of reply it is said: 'The Self is not touched by that [Ignorance].' As Rāhu, though visible in [the stead of] the sun, does not touch the latter, so Ignorance, though visible in [the stead of] the Self, does not touch the latter." On Rāhu see n. 60.

168 Cf. PS 22, and n. 76, 78. R. is very brief on PS 50, but seems to mean that, since the world is absolutely separate from the Self, there is neither an objective cause to the world (because the only real thing is the Self), nor is there any objective production or destruction of this world (because what does not really exist can neither come into nor pass out of being). Although R.'s first conclusion seems rather bold, it is possible that this verse should indicate an illusionistic kind of Advaita-Vedānta, which denies phenomenal existence all reality. (Cf. Schmithausen, 1965, pp. 151-3, 237-9; Introduction, above.)

169 R.: "Viz., Ignorance (*avidyā*), etc."

170 Though R. keeps silent on this point, I have added "seemingly"

on the analogy of PS 48, where *iva* is, according to him, also bivalent. (Cf. n. 163.) It would, indeed, be incongruous to say of the Self that it is "permanently free of connection to birth, etc.," as well as "always connected [to birth, etc.]," in one and the same verse.

[171] Cf. n. 139.

[172] Cf. n. 42, 55.

[173] Cf. PS 41-42.

[174] R. identifies the body, etc., with the "field" of PS 47. He quotes BhG 13.5-6: "The Great Elements, Ego Consciousness, Cognition, the Unmanifest as well, the ten Sense Faculties, the One [according to Śaṁkara: *manas*, "mind, thought"], and the five Objects of the Sense Faculties;. Volition, Hatred, Pleasure, Sorrow; the Aggregate (*saṁghāta*) [Śaṁkara: of the body and the sense faculties], Intelligence (*cetanā*), and the Foundation (*dhṛti*) [Śaṁkara: of the body and the faculties]: that, together with its transformations, is summarily called 'the field.' " See above, nn. 71, 68, 66, 29, 70, 67, respectively. The five Objects of the Faculties are Sound (*śabda*), of the Cognitive Faculty of Hearing, etc. These were called *viśeṣa* ("special property") by early Sāṁkhya, viz., of the five Great Elements, out of which they evolved, according to Pañcaśikha; and *tanmātra* ("pure entity") = *aviśeṣa* ("non-special property") by later Sāṁkhya, the Great Elements evolving out of them according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 312, 347-8, 355, 480, n. 171.)

R. further quotes KaṭhaU 3.10-11 (not: 1.3.10-11, as our printed AGM edition has): "For higher than the Sense Faculties are the Objects, and higher than the Objects is Mind. But higher than Mind is Cognition, higher than Cognition is the Great Self. Higher than the Great One is the Unmanifest (*avyaktam*)." In the epic tradition, as well as this *Upaniṣad*, the first entity to evolve from *Brahman* is the Great Entity (*mahad bhūtam, mahat tattvam*), sometimes called Great Self (*mahān ātmā*), i.e., the Embodied Soul. This is still unmanifest (*avyakta*), but the next stage, *manas*, is manifest (*vyakta*). (Cf. Frauwallner, p. 121.) This doctrine is found in the "Question of Śuka" (*Śukānupraśna*): MBh 12.231-33 Calcutta ed. However, a still older, but parallel doctrine taught in a fundamental verse of MDhŚ (1.14) does not mention a "Great Entity," but derives *manas* directly from *Brahman*, whereas a Great Self is derived from Ego Consciousness according to MDhŚ 1.15. (Cf. the commentaries quoted in Bühler's translation of "The Laws of

Manu," 1886, p. 7; Frauwallner, 1953, p. 462, n. 60.) All those ancient doctrines do not yet teach that the Great Self and Cognition (*buddhi*) are identical. Later on, Pañcaśikha's dualistic Sāṁkhya can no longer assume either that the evolution products, i.e., the universe, and beginning with *manas*, might evolve from the Soul (i.e., a Great Self), or that this Soul might do so from *Prakṛti* (which would be required from a dualist, if he wanted to retain Matter as the single primordial cause of evolution). This means that *manas* can no longer evolve from a *mahān ātmā*, but must do so from a *prākṛta* entity. The latter is called *buddhi* by Pañcaśikha, yet for tradition's sake he continues to equate it with the *mahān ātmā* of epic tradition.

R. here omits the final three *pādas* (b-d) of KaṭhaU 3.11, which he quoted *ad* PS 1 (see n.1). Possibly, he has done so in order not to have to admit that this *Upaniṣad* verse favours a non-dualistic interpretation inside the Sāṁkhya school, against the classical Sāṁkhya which he adopts elsewhere as the base of his explanations.

175 Cf. PS 20, 32, 54-5.

176 R.: "The individual soul (*jīva*)."

177 Addition in agreement with R.

178 R.: "Like a red ant, etc., who [happen to] be on a potter's wheel."

179 R. here, in contrast to PS 34 (see n. 136), explains *loka-vyavahāra* as that *vyavahāra* which is present in the world, i.e., in the aggregate of the effects (= the body) and Inner Organ, and explains *vyavahāra* as the wrong notion (*abhimāna*) that this aggregate is the Self (*ātman*). In other words, the digression by which R. explains *loka-vyavahāra* as *loka-stha-vyavahāra* is superfluous, this binominal compound meaning simply: "the wrong (but usual) conception of the world, which consists of bodies and inner organs, as being the Self." It is even possible that R. should have meant *-stha-* in the sense of "in respect of," but such a meaning is quite unusual, and may be rejected.

180 Cf. n. 107; PS 6, 29, 45. R. explains this clause by: "When they have entered another body, which consists (or: has the nature) of ignorance (*avidyāmaya*)," and thus links it directly to the "perplexed ones" being "bound to birth and death." This is why it seems justified to interpret the latter clause as giving the reason why those people "suffer when they have entered into blind darkness."

R. quotes BU 4.4.10ab (= ĪśaU 9ab): "Those who abide in

ignorance enter into blind darkness." The second hemistych has this wording: "Those who take their delight in knowledge [enter into] darkness even more than that, as it were." Śaṁkara adduces this as evidence for his claim that the *Vedas'* teachings, being devoted entirely to injunctions and prohibitions, thereby disregard the meaning of the *Upaniṣads*. This view of the *Vedas* is a common one in *Mīmāṁsā*, hence also in *Vedānta*, which is often called *Uttara* ("Further" or "Higher") *Mīmāṁsā* (in contrast to *Mīmāṁsā* proper, i.e., the science of *Veda* exegesis, which is designated as *Pūrva*, or "Former," *Mīmāṁsā*). It is almost needless to say that the contents of the *Vedas* are much richer than that, as has been made clear by the patient labours of many scholars, both in India and in the West, among whom Kuiper, the Dutch scholar, who was the first to see that the "pivot" of the *Ṛg-Veda*, viz., the myths expounding cosmogony, is based on mystic psychology.

[181] Śaṁkara *ad* BS 2.3.14 adduces the analogy of snow reverting to that from which it has sprung and which it essentially is, in order to explain his type of illusionistic *Satkāryavāda*. Cf. above, nn. 34, 93; Hacker, 1953, pp. 24 ff.

[182] Cf. Śaṁkara, BSBh 2.2.10; here, the Sāṁkhyist holds the following opinion: "And if the Vedāntin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, etc., we remark that there also the waves, etc., constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation." (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, p. 352.) The Sāṁkhyst's doctrine is a realistic Satkāryavāda, while Śaṁkara's is the same tinged with illusionism. The latter is also true of the doctrine expounded in PS. (See Introduction.)

[183] Cf. PS 33.

[184] R.: "This in the following sense: 'This is the natural (*naisargika*) conception of the world (*loka-vyavahāra*), caused by erroneous knowledge, [that one thinks], 'This am I,' 'This is mine,' by mixing up truth (*satya*) and falsehood (*anṛta*).' " That sentence is found in Śaṁkara's *Upodghāta ad* BSBh 1.1.1.

[185] R.'s (summarized) argument in explaining PS 56 runs as follows: "Why should the Lord, Viṣṇu [i.e., the Ātman], who is inside everything as its Inner Controller and its Soul, create anything? For if he has a purpose, i.e., has to achieve something, he cannot be perfect, i.e., cannot be God. So why is there any creation at all, or, as a further

question: is creation real?" The answer is that creation is a *Māyā*, i.e., an *illusory*, but nevertheless *objective* creation of God, which, by its illusory nature, does not compromise God's perfection: "Just as snow, foam, etc., are produced from water only as a transformation, not for a particular purpose, and as also smoke is from fire, so does *Māyā*, which consists of effects and [their] causes, manifest itself from the Supreme Lord himself only, but not for any purpose, because he cannot have a desire for anything, as he has [all] his desires satisfied."

R. quotes GK 1.9 in support of this: "Creation is for the sake of experience according to some, for the sake of amusement according to others. This is the own nature of God. What [could be] the desire of him, who has his desires satisfied?"

In view of the fact that *Māyā* here, as in PS 10, means "objective magic" rather than "absolutely non-existent illusion," R. appropriately ends his explanation of PS 56 with this remark: "In this theory, by the word *Māyā* is meant the manifestation (*pravṛtti*) of the all-pervasive Lord (*vibhu*), which has the form of *Māyā* and consists of the Creation (*sṛṣṭi*) of everything." On *pravṛtti* ("cosmic progression") as the principal function of Viṣṇu in the *Veda*, see Kuiper, 1962, p. 151.

[186] This verse places slightly more emphasis on the cognitive semanteme of the term "*māyā*" than the previous verse, which stressed its cosmogonical semanteme. (Cf. Hacker, 1953, p. 27; above, Introduction, and n. 185.)

[187] Cf. n. 64.

[188] R.: "With parts" means God's appearance "through *Māyā*, which has the nature of discursive development (*prapañca*) into names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*)." "Without parts" means his "existence in the form of Being (*sat*), Bliss (*ānanda*), and Thought (*cit*)."

[189] R.: "In a jar, etc."

[190] R.: "In the ocean, if thrown into the latter."

[191] R.: "A little bit of milk."

[192] R.: "A large amount of milk, if thrown into the latter."

[193] R.: "Produced by a Yak-tail fan, etc."

[194] R.: "The wind outside, if the former enters into the latter."

[195] R.: "Devoid of discursive development." (Cf. n. 188.)

[196] R. quotes ĪśaU 7: "When all beings have become the Self alone to him who knows, then, what delusion, what sorrow [can there be] for him, who sees [only] unity?" This is meant as a rhetorical question. The

verse PS 59 is in the same shape, but for a completely correct understanding its main clause has been changed from a Sanskrit affirmative-interrogative into an English negative-indicative.

[197] Cf. n. 55.

[198] Explanation in brackets accounts for R.: "The Self adopts an appearance due to the *Upādhis*," i.e., its realization for what it truly is remains impossible until it is observed without its *Upādhis*.

[199] Cf. PS 16.

[200] Cf. n. 19.

[201] R. reads *guṇāḥ* ("qualities"), *karaṇa-gaṇaḥ* ("assembly of organs"), against the text's *guṇa-gaṇa-karaṇa* (adopted as the base for translation), and explains plural *karaṇa* as "sense faculties" (*indriya*) instead of the triad of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, and *manas* (to which the *indriya* might be added). A reason for this somewhat unusual interpretation might be to avoid deciding the question of whether there is just one "Inner Organ" or more such organs. However, as the next verse speaks of a single organ (there called *dhī*, "thought," i.e., *manas*), we have reason to assume a single organ for this verse as well, probably under Yoga influence. (Cf. n. 35.)

[202] R.: "I.e., the 'lump' (*piṇḍa*)." Cf. n. 83.

[203] R. without further explanation identifies these with the single "Inner Wind" (*antarvāyu*) of the body. However, the *prāṇas* commonly occur in the plural, being the "forces of life" in the *Upaniṣads*. (Cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 81 ff.)

[204] See n. 69.

[205] R.: "Being a human, etc."

[206] R.: "The results of pure acts."

[207] R.: "The results of impure acts."

[208] Literally: "Having the form of the Spirit (*cit*)."

[209] Addition within brackets according to R.'s gloss.

[210] R. quotes ŚvU 3.19: "The Apprehender [i.e., *Ātman*] is swift, although he lacks hands and feet; he sees without eyes; hears without ears."

[211] See n. 209.

[212] See n. 201.

[213] See n. 209.

[214] *Aiśvarya*, the quality of being Lord (*īśvara*).

[215] I.e., the universe.

[216] R. quotes ChU 7.25.2: "All this is only the Self," where it is likewise taught that "he who sees thus, etc.," becomes "autonomous" (*svarāj*). Śaṁkara obviously regards this as "princely lordship," for he says that one is "anointed" to it and remains in that state even after the body's decease.

[217] Cf. PS 57; n. 188.

[218] R. says that "Delusion" consists of the opponents' doctrines, which he briefly outlines, in connection with the sentence: "All this is only the Self" (ChU 7.25.2, as quoted in n. 216). He regards it as directed against all theories which try to prove that "all this" is due to some other principle. He therefore also quotes BS 1.1.2: "[*Brahman* is that] from which the origin, [subsistence, and dissolution] of this [world proceed]." TU 3.1: "Whence these beings are born, by what, once born, they remain in existence, into what they return, reenter completely, that you must investigate into, that is *Brahman*." BhG 10.8: "I [Kṛṣṇa = Viṣṇu] am the origin of everything, from me everything springs." BhG 7.6.7: "I am the origin and likewise the destruction of the whole world; nothing else is higher than me, O Warrior [= Arjuna]." BhG 9.8: "Depending on my own Primordial Matter, I again and again create this whole complex of beings."

If R. claims doctrines which state, respectively, *Brahman* and Viṣṇu/Kṛṣṇa as the cause of the universe in support of ChU 7.25.2, this proves that the latter are identified with the *Ātman*.

[219] R. quotes MuU 3.2.9: "[He who] knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* alone (or: becomes that same *Brahman*)."

[220] "At the same time" in agreement with R.'s gloss.

[221] R.: "In order to prove their theories, being blind to their fallacies."

[222] R.: "Rational philosophies, such as *Karma-Mīmāṁsā*, *Sāṁkhya* (either Theistic or Atheistic), *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*; the Buddhist doctrines of Vacuity (*Śūnyavāda*), Mere Cognition (*Vijñānavāda* = *Vijñaptimātravāda* = *Yogācāra*), and Momentariness (*Kṣaṇikavāda*) [i.e., the School of the Logicians, epitomized by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti]; and the *Kṣapaṇaka-vāda* ("Doctrine of Mendicants") [i.e., the School of the Digambara Jainas, "those who have the quarters of space for their clothing"], and the *Svabhāva-vāda* ("Doctrine of Own Essence") [i.e., the School of the Śvetāmbara Jainas, "those who are clad in white," according to whom "the essence of a thing is its real existence" (*sadbhāvo*

hi svabhāvaḥ... dravyasya), as we read in Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra*, 2.4]."

On those various systems of philosophy, the works to consult are: Renou and Filliozat, 1953, chapters VII, XI, XII; Frauwallner, 1953 and 1956; id., 1969. Potter, 1970, will also be found quite helpful.

[223] R.: "The Holy Traditions which differ from *Vedānta*, i.e., from the Upaniṣadic Traditions. They belong to the Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas, Śāktas, and Sun Worshippers." On them see, e.g., Gonda, 1960 and 1963.

[224] R.: "Logical Arguments, informed by the respective Philosophies and Holy Traditions mentioned [in two preceding notes], and intended to confirm the truths of these."

[225] R. quotes in support of this whole verse GK 4.5: "We agree with the non-production proclaimed by those [disputants]; we do not disagree with them. Ye shall learn not to dispute." That refers to GK 4.3-4: "For only some disputants assume the production of that which is, yet others, wise men, [assume the production] of that which is not, in disputing with each other. Nothing arises that is, and also nothing arises that is not. For, in this way, the two parties, disputing with each other, proclaim non-production." (Cf. Vetter, 1978, p. 120.)

Space does not permit to go into the detail of these verses, but the reader may consult, e.g., MMK 21.12, BCA 9.35; and on "transcendent non-production" beyond the terms of the logical *catuṣkoṭi* ("tetralemma"), viz., production, non-production, both production and non-production, and neither production nor non-production: Jayatilleke, 1963, p. 350; Ruegg, 1969, pp. 384 ff. (quoting Prajñākaramati as stating that the first two terms of the tetralemma are equivalent to its full form, which may have some relevance in respect of GK 4.3-5); Warder, 1970, pp. 378 ff.

[226] R. quotes BhG 4.11: "In whichever form I [Kṛṣṇa/Viṣṇu] am resorted to by people, in that form I appear to them." Cf. GK 2.29: "Whichever nature [viz., of the *ātman*, imputed to it according to 2.19-28] one shows, that nature, then, he [i.e., the student, devotee, etc.] sees, to that he devotes himself; having become that one, he, entered into it [translated in accordance with Śaṁkara], immerses himself entirely in it."

[227] R.: "Everyone, not only a Brahmin or wandering ascetic, may, by zealous and uninterrupted meditation (*upāsanā*), by bringing devotion

(*bhakti*) toward his gods and *gurus*, become himself Lord of everything, because he is Nārāyaṇa." Here, in R.'s formulation, we find the process of meditation on the essential unity between the individual Self and Nārāyaṇa, which forms the theme of PS 67, supplemented (though not replaced) by a process of "loving, devoted service" (*bhakti*, literally: "participation") to achieve the ultimate goal of becoming Nārāyaṇa. Cf. PS 29; La Vallée Poussin, 1935, pp. 327 ff. (with interesting notes). On Nārāyaṇa as a god who was originally different from Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa/Vāsudeva, see Gonda, 1960, pp. 246-7.

It is noteworthy that R. still knows about the special and ancient relationship which the devotees of Nārāyaṇa maintained with the concept of *Bhakti*. Thus, in the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the MBh (12.334-5), "the vision of Nārāyaṇa" is taught as resulting only from "loving service rendered to Nārāyaṇa alone" (*ekānta-bhakti*). Even the term used for "meditation" by R., viz., *upāsanā* (or the corresponding absolutive indeclinable *upāsya* which he actually uses), often denotes the "identifying meditation" by which one may come to see the Lord in *Bhakti* practice. (Cf. Gonda, *l.c.*)

[228] R. quotes ChU 7.1.3: "He who knows the Self transcends sorrow." Cf. MuU 3.2.9: "He who knows that supreme *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* himself; no one ignorant of *Brahman* will there be in his clan. He transcends sorrow, transcends evil; free from ignorance in his heart, he becomes immortal."

[229] R.'s interpretation: "Because he is also Supreme *Kāla*," i.e., Time regarded as Death, is against syntax.

[230] Or: "Whence might something other than the Self produce itself [and so cause fear to him]?" These two translations are virtually equivalent, but the one adopted is the more plausible.

[231] R. explains "Supreme Reality" as *Puruṣa*, and its opposite as *Prakṛti*, without obvious necessity, but perhaps in anticipation of the next verse.

[232] Thus having obtained one's wish (i.e., the student's), as expressed in PS 7.

[233] Cf. n. 18 above.

[234] PS 70 presupposes a dualistic ontology and, consequently, soteriology. R. quotes MuU 3.2.8cd: "Thus, he who knows, delivered from name and form, enters into the *Puruṣa*, who is higher than the highest." Note that the latter verse is written in archaic *Triṣṭubh* metre,

and that it stands in a context which teaches unity between *ātman* and *brahman*. Cf. n. 174 above, where a quotation of KaṭhU 3.11 raises a similar problem with regard to interpretation.

[235] Translation against R., but in agreement with preceding and following verses. R. quotes BU 4.4.6: "If someone who loves the Self has reached the Self, his breaths do not pass upward [at his death, but, being *Brahman*, he goes to *Brahman*]." ChU 6.14.2 (not 20, as our text reads): "Of this [myself who have a teacher and have been freed from the blindfold of Nescience], there is to be [a remaining here] only so long as I shall not be released; then [Śaṁkara: 'as I discard my body, without any interval'], I shall return [to the Real]." BU 4.4.7: "Just as the dead, discarded skin of a snake lies shrunken on an antheap, so lies this body."

The meaning of PS 71 is: Natural things, such as the body, are "exhausted" or "destroyed" as soon as they have returned to (an awareness of) what they really are, viz., Matter, not the Ego. Thereby, Matter has, like certain plants, fulfilled its obligation, and may return to its primordial state, i.e., be destroyed. For the individual this means that, when he dies, not only his body but also his organs and "subtle body" (*sūkṣma-śarīra*, on which cf. Frauwallner, 1953, pp. 346, 365) are "destroyed," and that he will not be reborn. That implies a more realistic *Satkāryavāda* than the one proposed in BU 2.1.20, which R. quoted to explain PS 47. (Cf. n. 162 above.)

[236] R.: "I.e., the erroneous conception according to which the body, etc., are the Self."

[237] R.: "By the knowledge about the distinction between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*." (Cf. PS 7; MuU 2.2.8, quoted BSBh 3.3.32.)

[238] R.: "On such points as: 'Is there a Self apart from the body?', etc."

[239] In agreement with R.

[240] *Id.*

[241] Cf. nn. 151, 164 above.

[242] R. quotes AiU 1.1: "This was the Self, one only, in the beginning; blinking, it sees nothing else." MuU 2.2.8: "The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut, and the acts are destroyed of him, when this [Śaṁkara: 'omniscient, not transmigrating one'] is seen as the universe."

[243] This conventional translation of *dhāman* seems quite satisfactory

here, especially so as it is used in a negative, unqualified sense. A full discussion of the semantism of *dhāman* in the *Upaniṣads* is found in: Gonda, 1967, pp. 78-88.

[244] Cf. n. 236.

[245] R. quotes BU 1.4.10: "Whoever then awoke of the gods, he alone became that [*brahman*], and so of the sages, and so of men." R. discusses and rejects the theories on the nature of deliverance (*mokṣa*) of the Materialists (*Cārvākas*), Jainas (*Kṣapaṇakas*), the Buddhist Vijñānavādins, Mādhyamikas, and Logicians, the Theistic and Atheistic Sāṁkhyas, the Mīmāṁsakas, Pāśupatas (i.e., worshippers of Śiva as Paśupati, "Lord of Animals"), and Sātvatas (i.e., worshippers of Kṛṣṇa/Vāsudeva). (Cf. n. 222; on the latter two groups: Gonda, 1960, pp. 260 and 247, respectively.)

R. next quotes BhG 5.15cd-17 (translated in accordance with Śaṁkara's explanation): "Knowledge is veiled by ignorance, and people are deluded by this; but of whom that ignorance of the Self has been destroyed by knowledge, their knowledge illuminates that supreme one like the sun; having their cognition directed toward that [*Brahman*], having it as their Self, as their support (or: abode), as their [highest] aim, they go away never to return, having had the stains removed from their knowledge." ChU 7.26.2: "To him, after he has polished away the filthy coat [covering his soul: *kaṣāya* is especially "resin exuded by a tree," hence Ś.'s gloss, *vārkṣādir iva*, "like tree's [resin], etc."], the Lord, Sanatkumāra [usually a son of Brahmā, but here explained by Ś. as Skanda, son of Śiva], shows what transcends Darkness (*tamas*)." Ś. explains the addressee as "the one who is fit to do that," viz., *Yoga*, in other words the sage Nārada.

R. ends with a digression on the Buddhist Mādhyamikas' conception of Deliverance: "What then is this 'Cessation of Nescience' which is called Release (*mukti*)? [The Mādhyamikas say:] 'In the first place, it cannot be existent, for in that case it would have to be permanent, like the Self. Nor can it be inexistent, for then knowledge would be ineffective. It cannot be both existent and inexistent, for since existence and inexistence cancel each other out, they cannot operate at one place simultaneously without contradiction. Neither can it be characterized by the absence of both existence and inexistence, for then it would be identical with nescience, and existence and inexistence would be identical, which is a contradiction. It cannot be devoid of the four terms of the

syllogism [i.e., of the tetralemma as referred to in n. 225], because only something void (*śūnya*) could be so characterized.' That, however, cannot be true. For the meaning of the word 'void' is merely 'non-being,' which is opposed to being; and the void has no positive character, since the Cessation of Nescience, which is opposed to nescience, and which would differ from Being and Non-Being, would have five terms. Hence, there are four terms, viz., Being, Non-Being, Being and Non-Being, and that which differs from Being and Non-Being; and some term different from these would have to be adopted for the Cessation of Nescience. Moreover, the cessation of something erroneous is not different from a thing based on this and regarded as real, since, if the former is refuted, only the latter remains."

R. has completely misrepresented the Mādhyamikas' Doctrine of the Void (*Śūnyavāda*). For, according to the latter, there is a "fifth term," which is called Vacuity (*śūnyatā*), and which transcends the four terms of the tetralemma without negating their validity. It does so by operating on a transcendent (*pāramārthika*) plane of thought, while leaving the terms of the *catuṣkoṭi* to the plane of differentiating conceptualization (*vikalpa*) and discursive development (*prapañca*), i.e., the plane of common usage or common speech (*vyavahāra*). It follows from this that the Void does exist and have a positive character, precisely because it is not a real thing (*vastu*) which might exist, not exist, both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist. (See Ruegg, 1969, pp. 380-92.) R. has failed to see this because he has not made the all-important distinction between the two planes of thought.

[246] Cf. PS 33.

[247] R. explains those contrasts as due to discursive development (*prapañca*). (Cf. n. 245.) On *upādhika*, see n. 54 above.

[248] Cf. PS 53.

[249] R. quotes BS 4.1.13: "On the attainment of this [*Brahman*, there takes place] the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared [by Scripture]."

[250] This image belongs to the large stock of analogies common to Indian systems of thought. Thus, it is found already in the ancient Buddhist *Nikāyas* (*Aṅguttara*, PTS ed., II, pp. 38-9; *Saṁyutta*, id., III, p. 140): "As a lotus, born and having grown in the water, rises above the water without being soiled by it, so the Buddha, born and having grown up in the world, has triumphed over the world, and stays in it without being soiled."

[251] Addition in accordance with R.

[252] *Id.*

[253] The Horse Sacrifice (*aśvamedha*, or *hayamedha* as it is here called) is the "king of rituals" (ŚB 13.2.2.1); it is extremely meritorious, because it leads to the restoration of cosmic and social life from the realm of death. (Cf. Gonda, 1960, pp. 168 ff.) We may also see this from such passages as MDhŚ 11.75, 83, which state that the murderer of a Brahmin (*brahmahan*) cleanses himself of all sin by a horse sacrifice. The latter is therefore brought into clear contrast to the "great sin" (*mahāpātaka*) mentioned in PS 77, viz., *brahma-hatya*, "murdering a Brahmin." (Cf. MDhŚ 9.235 = 11.55.) It is even a mortal sin to execute a Brahmin for offences he has committed; as Manu (8.380-81) puts it: "No greater crime is known on earth than slaying a Brahmin."

The probable reason for this clear opposition between *Aśvamedha* and *Brahmahatya*, to the extent that the former should atone for the latter, is that both the horse in the *Aśvamedha*, and the Brahmin as a member of his caste mediate death on behalf of society by absorbing death into themselves. Consequently, if this function can no longer be fulfilled satisfactorily because some Brahmin has been killed, it can only be restored by killing a horse. (Cf. Alsdorf, 1962; Dumont, 1966, section 65, pp. 187 ff.: "Sur l'histoire du végétarisme.") However, the process of the perpetuation of life and death in an endless cycle is no longer possible in the case of the ascetic, who has recognized that, in reality, only his Self exists. Hence, to him, *Aśvamedha* and *Brahmahatya* have both become identical, and equally irrelevant. As Lingat (1967, pp. 18-9) writes about the Hindu concept of the "sacred world-order" (*dharma*): "Cette morale s'adresse à l'homme qui vit en société. Elle repose sur la croyance dans la rétribution des actes et dans le mécanisme de la transmigration. Quoique son fondement et sa sanction soient religieux, elle est essentiellement sociale, en ce sens que, l'ordre social se confondant avec l'ordre naturel, l'homme qui obéit à ses prescriptions remplit un devoir social tout autant qu'un devoir religieux... Le *saṁnyāsin*, en effet, a renoncé au monde, il est affranchi des rapports qui sont la trame même de la vie mondaine; pour lui, la morale de la société est sans objet." Compare with this a famous verse attested in the Buddhist *Udānavarga* (29.24, 33.61-2; cf. *Dhammapada* 294): "Having destroyed his mother, father, the king, and two learned Brahmins, and having destroyed the kingdom and the servants, a Brahmin goes without sin."

(Quoted by Ruegg, 1969, pp. 376-7). The difference between the "two learned Brahmins" and the latter Brahmin is that the former uphold the world order by the sacrificial services they render their patrons, while the latter, the "true" Brahmin, roams about as an ascetic.

254 Cf. Abhinavagupta, PS 71, 73: "Discarding arrogance, joy, anger, jealousy, despondency, fear, greed, and delusion, being without speech or thought (*mati*), let him behave like a fool (*jaḍa*), not issuing any laud (*stotra*) or incantation (*vaṣaṭkāra*)... Nothing apart from him exists which might be fit for laud or sacrifice. Would he, therefore, rejoice in a laud, etc., while being released, and free from salutation (*namaskṛti*) and incantation (*vaṣaṭka*)?" Compare GK 2.36-37: "Therefore, when one has thus recognized this [God], may one turn one's attention (*smṛti*) to that which (or: him who) is without multiplicity (*advaita*); having attained *Advaita*, let him live in the world like a fool (*jaḍa*). The ascetic (*yati*), not issuing a laud (*stuti*) or salutation (*namaskāra*), and not issuing a blessing (*svadhākāra*) either, and without support in what is fixed or not fixed, may he be autonomous." (On the verse GK 2.36, cf. Vetter, 1978, p. 125.) Furthermore, see Sprockhoff, 1976, p. 91.

255 The expression "having done what had to be done" (*kṛta-kṛtya*) is commonly found in Buddhist scripture, where it denotes the state of the saint (*arhat*) who has reached the knowledge that his impure inflows are destroyed (*āsrava-kṣaya-jñāna*). That knowledge is the first in a series where "what had to be done has been done." (Cf. *Vinayapiṭaka*, I, pp. 14, 35, 183; *Dīghanikāya*, I, pp. 84, 177, 203; *Majjhimanikāya*, I, p. 139; *Saṁyuttanikāya*, I, p. 140; *Aṅguttaranikāya*, I, p. 165; Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, ch. 7, v. 8, n. 6: translation La Vallée Poussin, t. V, pp. 13-4.) It leads in particular to *Nirvāṇa* at the end of this present life. (Cf. n. 257, below.) The term is also found in BhG 15.20 and MDhŚ 12.93.

256 Translation in accordance with R.'s gloss.

257 Text reads *abhinnam itthaṁ* ("thus non-plural"); but this is unlikely, as it would mean the same as *vidhūta-nānātvam* ("free from diversity") at the end of the second *pāda*. Moreover, Abhinavagupta reads *abhihitam itthaṁ* ("thus revealed") in the otherwise identical verse of his PS, viz., 82. (The metre makes no difficulty as it is based on morae.) This reading is the more likely, because it may refer to both the immediately preceding verse 79 in our PS, and the verses 67-69 in it. Between 69 and 80, we have a dualistic doctrine defended in 70-71, and one about *jīvan-*

mukti ("Release during one's lifetime") in 72 ff., to which 79 seems to refer in particular through the epithet of *kṛta-kṛtya*. (Cf. n. 255.) So what the qualification "thus revealed" of "the Self of everything" refers to is (1) the state in which the individual Self finds itself, after it has grasped Supreme Truth, particularly because "pervasive" (*vyāpinam*) in 80a takes up "universally present" (*sarvagatas*) from 79d, and generally because it summarizes the state of the Yogin released during his lifetime (*jīvan-mukta*), anticipated by *kṛta-kṛtya* in 79c; (2) by stating that the individual Self becomes one with the Supreme Self through knowledge, verse 67, according to which it becomes Lord of everything by recognizing the latter as its Self; (3) verses 68-69, as the reader will easily see. That seems the interpretation of the word "thus."

Nevertheless, R. understands *abhinnam* ("non-plural"), and quotes BU 1.4.10 in support of this: "He, then, who worships a certain godhead, thinking, 'That god is one being, I am someone else,' does not know the truth; thus, he is, as it were, cattle to the gods."

258 R. quotes KaṭhU 1.3.15: "Having worshipped that which is without beginning or end, higher than the high, solid, which is without speech, touch, or colour, which is imperishable, and also a flavour both permanent and as if without smell, he is freed from the teeth of death."

259 R. quotes ChU 6.2.1: "Being alone, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second."

260 R. quotes BU 4.3.32 (translated here in accordance with Śaṁkara): "He knew, '*Brahman* is bliss.' His is this highest bliss; the other beings subsist on part of just that bliss." Cf. TU 2.4.1: "Knowing the bliss of *Brahman*, from which words refrain, not grasping it with the mind, he is never afraid."

In this connection, let me quote one paragraph from a long digression in which R. discusses the meaning of the word "*Brahman*" in the so-called "Great Sentences" (*mahāvākyāni*) of the *Upaniṣads*, such as have been quoted in many notes on the verses of PS (e.g., *tat tvam asi,* "Thou art that," ChU 6.8.7, in n. 90). R. comes to the conclusion (as is common among Vedānta authors, his own interpretation being informed by that of Śaṁkara *ad* ChU 6.8.7) that those sentences mean *Brahman* = *Ātman* by a kind of approximating indication, which both abandons and retains some of the semantemes associated with *Brahman*; this is called *jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā*. It abandons everything it might denote otherwise, but retains the "purified" acceptation of "being mere *Brahman*." This

process of *jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā* is compared to the ordinary usage of the deictic pronoun "this" (i.e., one out of several of the language's "signs used for referring without designation," as they are defined by Weinreich, 1963, p. 145), in such propositions as: "This is person P," where the pronoun's intension is exhausted by its one-one correspondence to P. (On the problems involved here, see, e.g., Gaurinath Sastri, 1959, pp. 281 ff.; Smet, 1954; id., 1960; Sarvajñātman, SŚ, I, 145-249 = Vetter, 1972, pp. 60-87.)

R. is consequently in a position to define "bliss" as an epithet of *Brahman/Ātman* in the following way (thereby clarifying why it is called "incomparable" and "supreme" by PS 80): "Similarly, 'bliss' is, according to common experience, some cognitive function produced by the enjoyment of objects which are procured by pure actions, and universally generating the achievement of one's aims; while according to supreme truth it is the Inner Self. Thus, the word 'bliss' by its *literal* application refers to a meaning specified by what preceded, as in the phrase, '*Brahman* is discriminating knowledge and bliss.' Hence, the word 'bliss' *indicates*, by abandoning its intentional aspect consisting of cognitive function, that aspect of its meaning which consists of 'the one who observes this.' "

261 Cf. PS 70.

262 R. explains: Because "the discursive development of body and bodily elements has been retracted into its own place through a succession of steps which is the reverse of creation," and because this happened at the moment in which correct knowledge was produced, the Yogin will reach "Separation" at his death, no matter how his personal condition or situation is at that time. (Cf. PS 10.) It is interesting that R. here adds the term *piṇḍa* for the body, which is then reabsorbed into the "egg," etc. (Cf. n. 83.)

263 R. raises the following problem at the end of his commentary on PS 82: "Even so, if, at the moment of one's death, one has lost his memory, then, even if one knew the truth, one is not released, the Lord says in the BhG: 'He who passes away while proclaiming *Brahman*, which is the single syllable *Om*, and recalls me, he reaches my state; there is no doubt as to that.' [BhG 8.13.] That [other] person, on the contrary, can only be degraded: 'Those who stand in Truth go upward; the Passionate stay in the middle; the Dark, standing in the condition of the lowest quality, go downward. Darkness, inertia, senselessness, and

delusion alone come about, where Darkness predominates, O Joy of the Kurus [= Arjuna]!' [BhG 14.18, 13; cf. n. 19.]" Ādiśeṣa solves this problem with the words, "even involuntarily," in PS 83. (Also see n. 274.)

[264] Addition in agreement with R.

[265] Cf. PS 5, 7, 37, 41-2.

[266] R.: "I.e., someone who knows the distinction between *Prakṛti* [as characterized by the three *Guṇas*] and *Puruṣa*."

[267] Because, as we learned from PS 7, "Merit and Demerit [which result from acts, which belong themselves to *Prakṛti*] do not bind him who knows the distinction between the Qualities and the Soul." Here, as in PS 7, 70, etc., the tendency is dualistic, which is also suggested by another reference to BhG 8.13 (as quoted in n. 263 above).

[268] Cf. n. 263. Because PS 83 was quoted in *Yuktidīpikā*, which was written about 550 A.D., the PS must be earlier than that. (See Introduction, above.)

[269] R.: "The knowledge (*bodha*) which makes one immediately (*sākṣāt*) aware of unity with that, viz., Supreme Truth = *Brahman*," which is the goal of the road.

[270] In agreement with R.

[271] R.: "After he has been living in Brahmā's world for fifty years of Brahmā's life," i.e., for a hundred million million (= 10^{14}) days and nights.

[272] R.: "Due to the ancient impressions (*saṁskāra*, literally: 'conformations')."

[273] R. explains this epithet by the Yogin's having "become a distinguished Brahmin" then; but it is more likely that he is called thus because of his previous exertions at Yoga.

[274] On this "supreme place of Viṣṇu," which constitutes the goal of the Yogin, R. quotes BhG 6.37-45: "He who has lost self-control, but is still endowed with devotion, one whose mind has strayed from mystic union, if he does not reach the perfection of that union, which destiny does he go to, O Kṛṣṇa? Does he, desisting from both [self-control and devotion to God], perish like a burst cloud, without support, deluded on Brahmā's path, O large-armed one? Be pleased, O Kṛṣṇa, to crush this my uncertainty without leaving anything of it! For no one but you may possibly crush this uncertainty." To this plea of Arjuna the God replies: "O Pṛthu son, neither here nor in the beyond is there found to be

destruction of such a man; for no one who has done good things goes to a bad destiny, my child. After having won the worlds of those who perform good deeds, and having lived there for many seasons, he who has desisted from union is reborn in the house of pure, holy people, or even in the lineage of wise Yogins; for such a birth is very difficult to get in the world. There he gets this complete mastery of intellect which is the result of the former embodied existence, and he strives toward perfection even more. Even involuntarily, he is pushed by that mere former impression; even if he wants to know mystic union, he surpasses *Brahman* in its verbal state. But, striving through effort, the Yogin, cleansed of sins and perfected by many rebirths, goes from there to the highest destiny."

Compare with this ṚS 1.22.20 (quoted in Kuiper, 1962, p. 140): "The Sages (?) always see this highest place of Viṣṇu, which is like an eye hung in heaven." (*tád víṣṇoḥ paramáṁ padáṁ sádā paśyanti sūráyaḥ / divī̀va cákṣur ā́tatam.*) As regards the importance of that mythical "highest place of Viṣṇu" for the history of Advaita-Vedānta, see BSBh 1.2.12, quoting KaṭhU 1.3.9: "The passage, 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Viṣṇu,' represents the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course." (*so* [= *vijñānātmā rathī*] *'dhvanaḥ pāram āpnoti tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṁ padam iti ca paramātmānaṁ gantavyaṁ kalpayati.*)

Reference to a "mountain [called] *Viṣṇupada*" (i.e., Place of Viṣṇu) is also made in the laudatory inscription (*praśasti*) in three verses on the Iron Pillar of Mehrauli, eleven miles S. of Delhi (in front of the central opening to the Quwwat ul-Islam Mosque, in the Qutb Minar Enclosure, to be found in the middle of the E. side of the Lal Kot). On that "mountain" is stated to have been erected "the standard of Lord Viṣṇu." We can now see what that means: the Iron Pillar, as the World Tree or Pillar (*skambhá*), surmounted by Viṣṇu's standard (*dhvajá*), is rooted in the Cosmic Mountain, which, as "Viṣṇu's place," is the highest heaven (in particular identified with the night sky), as well as the "heavenly bucket" (*kóśa*) containing the subterranean water or ocean. (Cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1935, p. 49; Kuiper, 1962, p. 150; id., 1972; id., 1969, on the *dhvajá* as representing the cosmic axis or mountain, hence of Viṣṇu as the cosmic totality.) According to legend, the Iron Pillar rested on a large snake (apparently Anantaśeṣa; cf. nn. 25, 277), which was hidden under the surface of the earth; the Rājā, Ānaṅga Pāla II Tomāra, removed the pillar to see whether the legend was true, but this sacrilege cost the Tomāra clan their throne (to Shahab ud-Din Ghori, in 1191).

[275] R. explains this as either "existing in the middle of the sun disk," or "having the form of the self-luminous Spirit (*svaprakāśa-cit*)." He quotes BhG 15.12: "The heat which inheres in the sun and illuminates the whole earth, and that which is in the moon, and that which is in the fire: know that this is my heat!"

[276] R.: "I.e., the multitude of sentences to illuminate the intended meaning, which cannot be understood through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), etc." He quotes BS 3.3.1: "[The cognitions] intimated by all the *Vedānta* texts [are identical] on account of the non-difference of injunction, etc." (Cf. n. 12 above.)

[277] R. explains Śeṣa as being "not an ordinary sage, but Ananta," i.e., Ananta-, Nāga-, or Ādi-Śeṣa, the thousand-headed serpent which forms the couch of Viṣṇu during the intervals between the world creations, and thereby becomes "the support of the worlds." (Cf. nn. 25, 274). In other words, the human author of the PS was identified with Viṣṇu's cosmic support. (Cf. Gonda, 1960, p. 317.)

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